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Spatial and Temporal Extrapolation from Tested Program Behaviors
MARCEL BÖHME∗, National University of Singapore and Monash University, Australia
A fundamental challenge of software testing is the statistically well-grounded extrapolation from program
behaviors observed during testing. For instance, a security researcher who has run the fuzzer for a week has
currently no means (i) to estimate the total number of feasible program branches, given that only a fraction has
been covered so far, (ii) to estimate the additional time required to cover 10% more branches (or to estimate the
coverage achieved in one more day, resp.), or (iii) to assess the residual risk that a vulnerability exists when no
vulnerability has been discovered. Failing to discover a vulnerability, does not mean that none exists—even if
the fuzzer was run for a week (or a year). Hence, testing provides no formal correctness guarantees.
In this article, I establish an unexpected connection with the otherwise unrelated scientific field of ecology,
and introduce a statistical framework that models Software Testing and Analysis as Discovery of Species
(STADS). For instance, in order to study the species diversity of arthropods in a tropical rain forest, ecologists
would first sample a large number of individuals from that forest, determine their species, and extrapolate
from the properties observed in the sample to properties of the whole forest. The estimation (i) of the total
number of species, (ii) of the additional sampling effort required to discover 10% more species, or (iii) of the
probability to discover a new species are classical problems in ecology. The STADS framework draws from
over three decades of research in ecological biostatistics to address the fundamental extrapolation challenge
for automated test generation. Our preliminary empirical study demonstrates a good estimator performance
even for a fuzzer with adaptive sampling bias—AFL, a state-of-the-art vulnerability detection tool. The STADS
framework provides statistical correctness guarantees with quantifiable accuracy.
CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy→ Penetration testing; • Software and its engineering→ Soft-
ware testing and debugging;
1 INTRODUCTION
The development of automated and practical approaches to vulnerability detection has never
been more important. The recent world-wide WannaCry cyber-epidemic clearly demonstrates the
vulnerability of our well-connected software systems. WannaCry exploits a software vulnerability
on Windows machines to gain root access on a huge number of computers all over the world. The
ransomware uses the root access to encrypt all private data which would be released only if a
ransom is paid. Hospitals had to shut down because life-saving medical devices were infected [125].
In 2017, a company’s cost of cyber attacks world-wide was on average US$ 11.7 million, which
is a 22.7% increase from the preceeding year [96]. In February 2017, a bug was discovered in the
HTML parser of Cloudflare, a company which offers performance and security services to about
six million customer websites (incl. OKCupid and Uber). The bug leaked information, including
private keys and passwords [123]. In July 2017, a hacker stole 31 million USD from Ethereum, a
blockchain-based platform, exploiting a vulnerability in the implementation of a protocol that was
formally verified to be cryptographically sound [124]. To discover software vulnerabilities at scale,
we need automated testing tools that can be used in practice, that work by the push of a button.1
∗Dr. Böhme conducted this research at the National University of Singapore and has since moved to Monash University.
1We concretely position this work within the software security domain and leverage the appropriate terminology. We take
this position due to the practical impact and the recent, considerable traction of automated testing in the security domain.
The security domain also provides a more compact terminology: “Fuzzing” instead of “automated software testing”, “fuzzer”
instead of “testing tool”, “fuzzing campaign” instead of “execution of the testing tool”, etc. Nevertheless, the central concepts
that we present in this article apply to automated software testing and analysis, in general.
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Automated software testing (or fuzzing) has been an extremely successful automated vulnerability
detection technique in practice. Our own fuzzers [6, 8, 9, 82] discovered 100+ bugs and more than 40
vulnerabilities in large security-critical software systems. Fuzzers, such as AFL [98], Libfuzzer [109],
syzkaller [120], Peach [117], Monkey [113], and Sapienz [70] are now routinely used as automated
testing and vulnerability detection techniques in large companies, such as Google [116], Microsoft
[112], Mozilla [114], and Facebook [103]. The 2004 DARPA Grand Challenge inspired substantial
research in self-driving cars that are now a reality. The 2016 DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge
[102], the world’s first machine-only hacking tournament with $3.75 million in prize money, will
arguably provide a similar push of research in advanced automated vulnerability detection. A fuzzer
generates and executes program inputs, while a dynamic analysis (e.g., injected program assertions
[89, 92]) identifies test executions that expose a vulnerability.
1.1 Extrapolation: A Fundamental Challenge of Automated Testing
A fundamental challenge of software testing is the statistically well-grounded extrapolation from
program behaviours observed during testing [97]. Unlike automated verification, fuzzing does not
allow to make universal statements over program properties [37].
No formal guarantees. If a verifier terminates without a counter-example, it formally guaran-
tees the absence of vulnerabilities for all inputs. In contrast, a fuzzer perpetually generates random
inputs and checks whether any of those exposes a vulnerability. Clearly, if the fuzzer generates a
vulnerability-exposing input, a vulnerability exists. Yet, failing to expose a vulnerability does not
mean that none exists. In fact, Hamlet and Taylor [55] argue that no matter how long the fuzzer is
run (e.g., a year)—if no vulnerability is discovered, we cannot report with any degree of confidence
that none exists. So then, what is the utility of a fuzzing campaign that exposes no vulnerabilities?
No cost-effectiveness analysis. Suppose, a security researcher has run the fuzzer for one week
and exercised 60% of all program branches. Today, she has no means to estimate how much longer
it would take to achieve, say 70% coverage, or how much coverage would be achieved after, say
one more week. Perhaps the program is just very difficult to fuzz. However, there exists no formal
measure of fuzzability, either, that would allow to estimate the resources needed to achieve an
acceptable progress during a fuzzing campaign. In fact, our security researcher has no means to
determine whether the fuzzer can even achieve 70% branch coverage, at all. Some branches may
just not be feasible. Perhaps 100% of feasible branches have already been covered. In that case,
how should a security researcher judge the campaign’s progress towards completion? In practice,
exactly when to abort a fuzzing campaign is mostly a judgement call that requires experience and
guesswork.
No smart scheduling. The lack of oversight has consequences not only for individual security
researchers but for large multi-national companies as well. For instance, Google Security has heavily
invested into a large-scale fuzzing infrastructure called OSS-Fuzz which is now generating some 10
trillion test inputs per day for more than 50 security-critical open-source software projects [116].
Each project is assigned roughly the same time budget. This is a waste of resources since fuzzing
campaigns for certain programs stop making any progress after only a few hours while campaigns
for other programs continue to make progress for days on end. For now, there is no automated
mechanism to measure how far a fuzzing campaign has progressed towards completion. Hence, no
smart scheduling strategies for fuzzing campaigns have been developed, yet.
A security researcher has no means to estimate the progress of the current fuzzing campaign
towards completion or the confidence that the campaign inspires in the program’s correctness. At
any time into the campaign, the researcher has no means to gauge (let alone predict) the expected
return on investment: How much more would she learn if she continued the campaign?
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Fig. 1. Species of arthropods (i.e., “bugs”) discovered during ecological surveys in Singapore and Malaysia.
The diversity and richness of arthropod species in tropical rain forests are notoriously difficult to assess due to
the immense sampling effort that is required. According to a recent estimate [4], there are 6.1 million tropical
arthropod species (high richness), most of which are rare (high diversity). Photo Credit : Marcel Böhme with
the permission from Lee Kong Chian Natural History Museum, Singapore.
1.2 An Unexpected Connection With Ecology
In this article, I establish an unexpected connection with the scientific field of ecology, a branch of
biology that deals with the relations of organisms to one another and to their physical surroundings.
I argue that methodologies to estimate the number of species in an assemblage2 provide an ideal
statistical framework within which one can assess and extrapolate the progress of a fuzzing
campaign towards completion and the confidence it inspires in the program’s correctness. I conduct
a preliminary empirically evaluation and outline future research directions to tailor and improve
these methodologies for the requirements of automated software engineering and security.
Discovery in testing. My key observation is that automated software testing and analysis are
about discovery. A fuzzer generates test inputs by sampling from the program’s input space, and
thus discovers properties about the program’s behavior. Depending on the concrete objective,
discovery means to find new bugs or vulnerabilities [7], to exercise interesting program paths [98],
to cover new coverage goals, to kill stubborn mutants [64], to explore new program states [5, 85],
to report unexpected information flows [71], or to explore new event sequences [113].
Discovery in ecology. Similarly, ecologists are concerned with the discovery of species in an
assemblage. For instance, in order to study the biodiversity of arthropods in a tropical rain forest
(Figure 1), ecologists would first sample a large number of individuals from that forest and determine
their species. However, since sampling effort is necessarily limited, the sample is usually incomplete.
The sample may contain several abundant species and miss many rare species. Biostatisticians
spent the last three decades constructing a well-grounded statistical framework within which they
can extrapolate, with quantifiable accuracy, from properties of the sample to properties of the
complete assemblage (e.g., arthropod diversity in the tropical rain forest) [12, 20, 35].
2An assemblage is a group of individuals belonging to a number of different species that occur together in space and time.
For example, all birds that live on an island today form an assemblage; all plants currently on Earth form an assemblage; etc.
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STADS framework. My key observation allows us to model software testing and analysis as
discovery of species (STADS). Consequently, STADS provides direct access to a rich statistical
framework in ecology. Within the STADS framework, security researchers can leverage method-
ologies to accurately estimate the degree to which a software has been tested and to extrapolate,
with quantifiable accuracy, from the behavior observed during testing to the complete program
behavior. We show that an estimate of the probability to discover a new species provides a statistical
correctness guarantee. Moreover, we present novel methodologies to assess campaign completeness
(i.e., the progress of an ongoing campaign towards completion), cost effectiveness (e.g., the additional
resources required to achieve an acceptable completeness), and residual risk that a vulnerability
exists when none has been discovered.
Terminology. A fuzzer generates test inputs for a program. In STADS, a test input corresponds to
an individual or sampling unit. A dynamic analysis identifies the species for an input. For instance,
the AFL [98] instrumentation identifies the path exercised by an input; AddressSanitizer [89]
identifies the memory error exposed by an input (if at all). A species is rare if only a few generated
test inputs belong to that species while a species is abundant if a large number of test inputs belong
to that species. The relative abundance of a species describes the probability to generate a test input
that belongs to that species. The program’s input space represents the assemblage. The set of test
inputs generated throughout a fuzzing campaign corresponds to the survey sample. We refer to
Chao and Collwell (2017) [20], Chao and Lou [23], and Collwell et al. [33] for recent reviews of the
literature on the pertinent models and estimators spanning three decades of research in ecology.
Hypothesis. I hypothesize that within STADS rare species which have been discovered explain
the species within the fuzzer’s search space that remain undiscovered. Intuitively, it is the “difficulty”
to discover a rare species—measured by the total number of test inputs that needed to be generated
before discovering the rare species—that provides insights on the discovery of undetected species
which are evidentlymuch rarer. A similar hypothesis is underpinning the nonparametric biostatistics
in ecology [17]. In order to test this central hypothesis, we need to establish the accuracy of existing
estimators and extrapolators from ecology within the STADS framework.
Species richness S . Estimating the total number of species S in the assemblage is a classical
problem in ecology. If an ecologist samples n individuals and discovers S(n) species, then (S − S(n))
species remain undetected. In order to quantify the species richness of the complete assemblage,
nonparametric estimators Sˆ have been developed that become more accurate as sampling effort
n increases [15, 16]. For instance, recently ecologists estimated the total number of species on
Earth as 8.7 million [77] while only 14% have been discovered despite two centuries of taxonomic
classification. In STADS, an estimate Sˆ of the asymptotic total number of species allows us to
estimate the proportion Gˆ = S(n)/Sˆ of all Sˆ species that have been discovered. For instance, we
could estimate the feasible branch coverage, i.e., the proportion of actually feasible branches covered
so far. The species coverageG can be used to assess campaign completeness, i.e., how much progress
has been made towards completion. It could also be used to devise smart scheduling strategies
for fuzzing campaigns that automatically abort a campaign that has reached a certain degree of
completeness Gˆ, and schedule the next one.
Discovery probabilityU (n). In ecology, the discovery probabilityU (n)measures the probability
to discover a new species with the n + 1th generated test input. The discovery probability can be
estimated accurately and efficiently from the sample alone [48]. In the STADS framework, if the
dynamic analysis is able to identify vulnerabilities, then the discovery probability U provides a
statistical guarantee that no detectable vulnerability exists if none has been discovered. In other
words, security researchers can use the STADS statistical framework for residual risk assessment.
In ecology, the sample coverage C = 1 − U quantifies the completeness of the sample, i.e., the
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proportion of individuals in the assemblage whose species is represented in the sample. Sample
coverage is routinely used to choose the most accurate estimator for other quantities, such as
species richness S [11] and to compare attributes of species across different assemblages [23].
Extrapolating species discovery S(n +m∗) and U (n +m∗). An extrapolation allows to assess
the trade-off between investing more resources and gaining more insight. In ecology, there exist
methodologies to quantify this return on investment. In STADS, a security researcher can use these
methodologies to make an informed decision whether to continue or abort a fuzzing campaign.
Suppose, the client requires a statistical guarantee of U (n +m∗) = 10−8 as upper bound on the
probability that the fuzzer finds a vulnerability in the program. The researcher can estimate the
additional fuzzing effortm∗ that is required to achieve that degree of confidence in the program’s
correctness. Suppose, a fuzzer has achieved a statement coverage of G(n) = 60%. Within STADS,
the statistically well-grounded extrapolation allows to estimate the coverage G(n +m∗) that would
be achieved ifm∗ more test inputs were generated.
1.3 Contributions
This article addresses the fundamental challenge of statistically well-grounded extrapolation both
(i) spatially (i.e., from behaviors observed during fuzzing to all program behaviors) as well as
(ii) temporally (i.e., if the campaign was continued for some more time). We provide the first general
statistical model of software testing and analysis as discovery of species (STADS). For the first time,
practitioners can use well-researched methodologies from ecology to make informed decisions
about the fate of a fuzzing campaign and quantify what has been learned about the program. Within
STADS researchers can, for the first time, formally define novel metrics, and identify or develop
their estimators to investigate interesting properties of software, fuzzing campaign, and fuzzer.
• A fuzzer’s effectiveness and efficiency may be measured and compared across other fuzzers.
Effectiveness is determined by the number of species within the fuzzer’s search space.
Efficiency is determined by the number of species discovered per generated test input.
• A campaign’s completeness, cost-effectiveness, and residual risk may be assessed as it is
ongoing. Campaign completeness can be judged by the species coverage G(n) or the sample
coverageC(n) = 1−U (n). Cost-effectiveness can be assessed via extrapolation of the species
discovered S(n +m∗) or confidence achieved U (n +m∗) ifm∗ additional test inputs were
generated. The campaign’s residual risk can be assessed via the discovery probabilityU (n).
• The difficulty to fuzz a program (i.e., software fuzzability) can be estimated from the relative
species abundance distribution. Intuitively, as the proportion of rare species increases, the
difficulty to discover species increases as well.
The primary contribution of this article is the STADS model which establishes the connection
with ecology to provide access to a rich statistical framework that can address the challenges in
automated software testing and analysis. However, due to space limitation, we can only present
and investigate some pertinent aspects of the STADS framework. Specifically, this article makes
the following secondary contributions.
• Hypothesis. I hypothesize that rare species which have been discovered explain the species
within the fuzzer’s search space that remain undiscovered. This hypothesis underpinning
the STADS framework is tested successfully in our empirical study. Estimators and extrapola-
tors that are based on rare species (i.e., singleton and doubleton species) demonstrate a good
performance for automated software testing and analysis. Within the STADS framework,
we make no assumptions about the total number, relative abundance distribution, or location
of species within the program’s input space.
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• STADSmodels. Themultinomial model—where each input belongs to exactly one species—
is integrated into the STADS framework and empirically evaluated. For instance, an input
can execute only one path, exercise only one method call sequence, compute only one final
output, crash only at one program location. The Bernoulli product model—where each input
belongs to one or more species—is integrated into the STADS framework. For instance,
a single input can exercise multiple coverage-goals (e.g., program statements, branches,
or methods), kill multiple mutants, witness multiple information flows, violate multiple
assertions, expose multiple bugs, and traverse multiple program states. For both models,
we provide an extensive survey of ecological methodologies to estimate and extrapolate
relevant quantities within the STADS framework, and show how these methodologies can
solve hard problems that have been long-standing in automated software engineering.
• Evaluation. In order to conduct an empirical evaluation of the multinomial model within
the STADS framework, we fuzz six security-critical open-source programs for a cumu-
lative 8.2 months using the popular, state-of-the-art fuzzer AFL [98]. The evaluation of
two estimators (Gˆ(n) [15], Uˆ (n) [48]) and one extrapolator Sˆ(n +m∗) [90] demonstrate
a reasonably low bias and high precision. We find that, despite the adaptive sampling
bias of AFL, the methodologies are statistically consistent, meaning that bias decreases
and precision increases as more test inputs are generated. The estimate for one fuzzing
campaign is fairly representative for other fuzzing campaigns of the same length.3
The STADS framework exhibits some peculiar features that make the direct application of exist-
ing ecologic methodologies more challenging: One has to deal with extremely large populations
containing a huge number of species (e.g., millions of program branches), where most species are
rare. Sampling strategies of feedback-directed fuzzers are (intentionally) subject to adaptive bias.
For instance, in search-based software testing (SBST) [73, 74] the species discovered by future test
inputs depend on the “fitness” of past test inputs. We point out many opportunities to identify,
improve, tailor, and develop novel methodologies that address the peculiarities of the STADS model
and sketch solutions to correct the adaptive bias of feedback-directed fuzzers.
1.4 Outline
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the main technical
challenges and contributions using a practical motivating example. Section 3 introduces the STADS
framework and multinomial model more formally and explains how the model relates to automated
testing tools in practice. Sections 4 and 5 follow with a survey and discussion of estimation and
extrapolation in multinomial model of the STADS framework, respectively. In Section 6, we provide
a preliminary empirical evaluation of the estimators and extrapolators within the multinomial
model. In Section 7, we extend the STADS framework to account for inputs that can belong to
multiple species by introducing the Bernoulli product model. In Section 8, we survey the relevant
related literature. After an extended discussion of the peculiarities of the STADS framework and
opportunities for future research in Section 9, we conclude in Section 10.
2 MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
We introduce the main ideas of our statistical framework of software testing and analysis as
discovery of species (STADS) using the following motivating example. We ran the fuzzer American
Fuzzy Lop (AFL) for one week on the program libjpeg-turbo compiled with AddressSanitizer (ASAN).
3More specifically, an estimate is fairly representative for other fuzzing campaigns where the same program is fuzzed for
the same time using the same fuzzer and seed corpus (if any).
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Without Extrapolation With Extrapolation
american fuzzy lop 2.44b (djpeg)
________________________________________________________________________
| run time : 0 days, 12 hrs, 0 min, 5 sec | cycles done : 53 |
| last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 17 min, 44 sec | current paths : 4944 |
| last uniq crash : none seen yet | uniq crashes : 0 |
. . .
extrapolation edition yeah! (djpeg)
___________________________________________________________________
residual risk : 7·10^-06 | total inputs : 63.6M |
path coverage : 77.6% paths covered | singletons : 447 |
discover new path : 0 hrs, 1 min, 36 sec | doubletons : 70 |
142k new inputs needed | |
12h into the campaign & 18mins since last path. Only 78% of all paths?
(a) Keep going? (c) Let’s keep going!
american fuzzy lop 2.44b (djpeg)
________________________________________________________________________
| run time : 1 day, 0 hrs, 0 min, 5 sec | cycles done : 74 |
| last new path : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 31 sec | current paths : 5127 |
| last uniq crash : none seen yet | uniq crashes : 0 |
. . .
extrapolation edition yeah! (djpeg)
___________________________________________________________________
residual risk : 8·10^-07 | total inputs : 124.8M |
path coverage : 97.9% paths covered | singletons : 95 |
discover new path : 0 hrs, 15 min, 9 sec | doubletons : 42 |
1.3M new inputs needed | |
12h later, AFL has found only about 150 new paths. ∼98% of all paths that the fuzzer can cover are covered.
However, it found the last one only 31s ago. It would take ∼15 mins to discover just one more path.
(b) Continue or abort? How far towards “completion”? (d)We should probably abort!
Fig. 2. The left-hand side (“without extrapolation”) shows the first few lines of AFL’s retro-style UI (AFL
v2.44b). Specifically, it shows the pertinent information for the fuzzing campaign (a) at 12 hours and (b) at 24
hours. The right-hand side (“with extrapolation”) shows our extension with estimates of the residual risk (i.e.,
the probability to discover a (crashing) path with the next input that is generated), the path coverage (i.e., the
proportion of paths discovered), and the time or test inputs needed to discover the next path—for the fuzzing
campaign (c) at 12 hours and (d) at 24 hours.
AFL [98] is the state-of-the-art fuzzer for automated vulnerability detection. Libjpeg-turbo [110] is a
popular, security-critical image parsing library that is used in many browser and server frameworks.
ASAN [89] is a dynamic analyzer that identifies buffer overflows and other memory-related errors
and vulnerabilities. We use that fuzzing campaign to illustrate the challenges and opportunities of
automated testing and analysis in general.
Path discovery. While the true objective of AFL is to discover a maximal number of errors, it is
an unlikely measure of progress; errors are (thankfully) rather sparse in the program’s input space.
Instead, the more immediate (and measurable) goal of AFL is to explore paths.4 AFL’s compiler-
wrapper afl-gcc instruments the program such that each path yields a different path-id. ASAN
instruments the program such that it crashes for inputs exposing a memory-related error. Hence,
AFL’s concrete testing objective is to discover a maximal number of paths and crashes.
Species discovery. In ecology, researchers sample individuals from an assemblage and identify
their species to gain insights about the species richness and diversity of the assemblage. AFL’s
fuzzer afl-fuzz generates and executes test inputs for the instrumented program by applying
random mutation operators at random points in a random seed file. In other words, AFL is a (biased)
stochastic process that samples test inputs from the program’s input space. Our assemblage is the
program’s input space.5 Our individual is a discrete input. Our sample is the set of all test inputs
that have been generated throughout the current campaign. In this example, our species is the tuple
(path-id, crashing) where crashing is true if the input crashes the program and false otherwise.
ASAN and afl-gcc together form the dynamic analysis that identifies the species for a program
input. The general testing objective is always to discover a maximal number of species.
4To address path explosion, AFL clusters paths that exercise the same control-flow edges and do not yield substantially
different hit counts for each edge [9]. Effectively, AFL reports the number of discovered path clusters rather than the number
of discovered paths. For simplicity, we stick to the AFL terminology.
5This is grossly simplified. Technically, our assemblage is the set of all program inputs that AFL is capable of generating
using the available seed files and mutation operators. All statistical claims will hold only over AFL’s search space.
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Challenges. Figure 2.a) shows the progress for our fuzzing campaign after the passage of 12
hours—just like a security researcher might see it. In 12 hours, AFL has generated ∼63 million
(63M) test inputs and completed 53 cycles through the seed inputs. AFL has discovered about 5
thousand (5k) paths, and about 18 minutes (18 min) have passed since the discovery of the most
recent path. Since the security researcher is given only the total number of paths, she cannot make
an informed decision concerning the progress of the fuzzing campaign towards completion. About
18 minutes have passed since the last discovery of a new path. So, the researcher might reckon that
the probability to discover a new path is very low. However, as we will see below, the time since the
last discovery is rather unreliable and often changes several times per minute by up to four orders
of magnitude. No crashes have been found. At 12 hours, the security researcher has no handle on
the progress of the fuzzing campaign towards completion or on the correctness of the program.
Figure 2.b) shows the progress for our fuzzing campaign after 24 hours. The security researcher
has learned that the number of discovered paths has not increased substantially in the last 12 hours.
She may (or may not) decide to discontinue the fuzzing campaign based on this observation alone.
However, the most recent path was found only a few seconds ago. So, she might be swayed to
continue for at least a few more hours. Still, no crashes have been found. Even after 24 hours, the
security researcher has no definite handle on making an informed decision about the completeness
of the fuzzing campaign or how confident she can be in the correctness of the program.
2.1 Assessing Residual Risk Using the Discovery Probability
“Testing can be used to show the presence
of bugs, but never to show their absence.”
Edsger Dijkstra (1970) [37]
Finding no vulnerabilities in a (long-running) fuzzing campaign does not mean that none exists.
A residual risk assessment would allow us to quantify the confidence the campaign inspires in the
correctness of the program. In fact, our STADS framework provides statistical guarantees about the
absence of vulnerabilities with quantifiable accuracy (e.g., 95%-confidence intervals). In order to
assess the residual risk, we suggest to estimate the probabilityU to discover a new species with the
next generated test input. If the dynamic analysis, as in our motivating example, is able to identify
vulnerabilities, then undiscovered vulnerabilities correspond to undiscovered species. Hence, the
discovery probabilityU provides an upper bound on the probability to discover a new vulnerability
with the next input that is generated. From this perspective, I argue that testing can be used to show
that bugs are absent with a certain likelihood (1−U ) that can be estimated efficiently and accurately
during a fuzzing campaign, with a likelihood that increases over the course of a campaign.
In ecology, the discovery probabilityU gives the proportion of individuals in the assemblage whose
species are not represented in the sample. In our motivating example, the discovery probability
gives the proportion of all inputs in the input space that exercise yet undiscovered paths. We
could say,U represents how much of the program behavior remains untested. The inverse of the
discovery probability 1/U provides the number of test inputs that we can expect to generate before
discovering a new (path) species. The sample coverageC = 1−U is the complement of the discovery
probability and effectively quantifies the degree of confidence that the fuzzing campaign inspires
in the correctness of the program. In our example, at least C% of all inputs that AFL is capable of
generating are expected to execute without crashes.
Out of the box, AFL already reports the time since the last discovery of a new species (Fig. 2.a+b;
last new path). This time to last discovery can be used as an estimate of the expected time to the
next discovery. However, as we will see shortly, this estimate is very unreliable. Given the number
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(a) Empirical probability (Uˆemp) (b)Moving median (Uˆmm) (c) Good-Turing estimate Uˆ )
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Fig. 3. Estimating the current discovery probability, i.e., the probability that a generated input discovers a
previously undiscovered path over 24h (top) and 168h (bottom).
m of test inputs that have been generated in the time since the last discovery, we can compute the
empirical discovery probability as Uˆemp = 1/m. However, the discovery probability thus estimated
changes by orders of magnitude in a matter of seconds.
In Figure 3, we can see several estimators of the current discovery probability in an ongoing
fuzzing campaign: a) the empirical probability (i.e., 1 − 1/m wherem is the number of test inputs
needed to discover the most recent path), b) the rolling median (i.e., the median empirical probability
for the discovery of theN = 11most recent paths), and c) the Good-Turing estimator that is available
in our STADS framework. Figure 3.a shows the empirical discovery probability Uˆemp one day and
seven days into the fuzzing campaign, respectively. Unlike the sample coverage C = 1 −U , the
discovery probability U can be represented on a log-scale. For instance, t = 100 hours into the
fuzzing campaign we find the empirical probability at about 2 · 10−8. In other words, it took about
(2 · 10−8)−1 = 50 million test inputs to discover the next path. However, the empirical probability
changes quite substantially in a matter of seconds. Particularly in the first 24 hours, the change can
be over four orders of magnitude (Fig. 3.a, top).
In signal processing, quick but large swings are often addressed with a moving average, the
mean value of a set of N successive points. However, the moving average is susceptible to extreme
events. Instead, the moving median is more robust, i.e., the median value of a set of N successive
points. As we can see in Figure 3.b, the swings of the moving median Uˆmm are still quite substantial,
between one and three orders of magnitude. The moving median is right-aligned, meaning that
the discovery probability estimate at time t is computed as the median of the N empirical values
just preceding t . Hence, the moving median also generally over-estimates the discovery probability.
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Increasing N to smooth the swings would only increase the bias. Moreover, Uˆmm is not consistent,
meaning that Uˆmm is not guaranteed to approach the true discovery probability as sampling effort
increases. So, the median (and mean) of the last N empirical probabilities Uˆmm is also an unreliable
estimator of the current discovery probability (Fig. 3.b; N = 11).
Main Hypothesis. Almost all information about number and relative abundance of species that
remain undiscovered is in the number and relative abundance of rare species that have been discovered.
The main hypothesis of the STADS framework applied to our motivating example is that the
number and “size” of paths that AFL has exercised only once or twice throughout the fuzzing
campaign contains almost all information about the paths that are yet to be explored. Specifically,
we denote as singletons those paths that are exercised by exactly one generated test input. Similarly,
we denote as doubletons those paths that are exercised by exactly two generated test inputs. In
Figure 2.d), we can see that one day into the fuzzing campaign after generating 125 million test
inputs, there are still 95 singletons and 42 doubletons (∼3% of discovered paths). This is one singleton
for every 1.3 million generated test inputs. Clearly, it would require at least as many new test
inputs to discover the next undiscovered path. In fact, this is the main insight of the Good-Turing
estimator of the discovery probability. The Good-Turing estimator [48] is computed as the number of
singletons divided by the number of samples (i.e., generated test inputs). The Good-Turing estimator
is used across many disciplines of science, including rare event estimation [78], cryptanalysis [47],
computational linguistics [42], and biology [23].
The main hypothesis of the STADS model holds for our motivating example. The proportion of
generated inputs that exercise singleton paths accurately predicts the current discovery probability.
In the bottom of Figure 3.c, we can see that the Good-Turing estimate Uˆ is not subject to huge
swings like both empirical estimators. In fact, it was formally shown that i) the estimator’s accuracy
strictly increases as the sample size (i.e., number of generated test inputs) increases [93], ii) its
convergence to the true value is also reasonably fast [130], iii) its mean squared error is reasonably
low [87], and iv) its performance is close to the best natural estimator for any distribution [79].
Figure 2 shows the discovery probability estimate Uˆ , just like a security researcher might see it
if she uses our AFL extension. Uˆ is shown under residual risk because the discovery probability
provides an upper bound on the probability of discovering a vulnerability with the next input that
is generated. Even if no crashing path has been detected in a very long running fuzzing campaign,
there always exists a residual risk that an unexplored crashing path might be discovered in the
future when more resources are being invested.
Twelve hours into the fuzzing campaign the discovery probability is shown as Uˆ = 7 · 10−6 (Fig.
2.c). The discovery probability is estimated as f1/n where f1 is number of singletons (f1 = 447) and
n is the number of total inputs (n = 63.6 · 106). Depending on the which residual risk is deemed
acceptable, the security researcher can use the discovery probability to decide whether to continue
or abort the fuzzing campaign. In fact, twelve hours later, one day into the fuzzing campaign, the
discovery probability has decreased by one order of magnitude (Uˆ = 8 · 10−7; Fig. 2.d).
We can use the discovery probability to compute other descriptive statistics, which the security
researcher can use for her decision. For instance, the fuzzing effort has also increased by an order
of magnitude: While it took only 1.5 minutes to discover a new path 12 hours into the fuzzing
campaign, she can expect it takes 15 minutes to discover a new path 24 hours into the fuzzing
campaign.
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2.2 Assessing the Completeness of the Fuzzing Campaign
“Currently, there is no sound basis to
extrapolate from tested to untested cases.”
Michael Whalen on the Future of V&V [97]
AFL shows the number of paths that have been discovered in the current sampling campaign
(Figure 2.a+b). However, without an estimate of the number of paths that remain undiscovered, a
security researcher cannot judge whether this is close or far from the discovery of all paths.
Within the STADS framework, we define species coverage G as the proportion of the asymptotic
total number of species that have been discovered. In our motivating example, the path coverage—
which is one kind of species coverage—gives the proportion of paths that have been discovered in
the current fuzzing campaign. Hence, path coverage is a measure of the progress of the current
fuzzing campaign towards completion. Unlike measures of code coverage, where the total number
of elements is (assumed to be) known a-priori, path coverage is more difficult to measure since the
total number of paths is unknown. Currently, a security researcher has no means to compute the
path coverage at any point in the fuzzing campaign.
asymptote @ 5408 paths
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Subject : libjpeg-turbo [110]
Test driver : djpeg
Fuzzer : AFL [98]
Dynamic analysis : ASAN [89]
Fuzzing time : 168 hours
Generated inputs : 973 · 106
Discovered paths : 5392 (99.7%)
Est. total paths : 5408
Unique crashes : 0
Fig. 4. Example fuzzing campaign. (a) Number of paths discovered over time. (b) Descriptive statistics.
Figure 4 shows the number of paths S(n) that AFL discovered in libjpeg-turbo as the number of
generated test inputs n increases.6 We can see that the number of paths discovered approaches an
asymptote, which we estimate to be at Sˆ = 5408 paths (using the Chao1-estimator of species richness
[15]). The asymptote represents the total number of paths that the same fuzzer can discover for the
same program given unlimited time. Essentially, we estimate the y-intercept Sˆ of the asymptote
and yield Gˆ(n) = S(n)/Sˆ .
Figure 2 shows the path coverage estimate, just like a security researcher might see it if she
uses our AFL extension. 12 hours into the fuzzing campaign, AFL is estimated to have achieved
77.6% path coverage for the test driver of libjpeg-turbo (Fig. 2.c). This clearly indicates that the
researcher should continue the fuzzing campaign in order to explore a greater percentage of paths.
12 hours later, one day into the fuzzing campaign, the path coverage has increased to 97.7% (Fig.
2.d). At this point, she might decide to abort the fuzzing campaign if she feels that the time that
AFL would require to explore the remaining paths is too high. In fact, two days later (i.e., 3 days
into the fuzzing campaign) the path coverage has increased only to 99.1% and six days later (i.e.,
7 days into the fuzzing campaign) to 99.7%. Basically, spending six (6) times more hours fuzzing
libjpeg-turbo only increased the path coverage by two percentage points. Clearly, the security
6For convenience, Figure 4.a actually shows S (n) over time.
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Fig. 5. Code coverage extrapolation: How much coverage is achieved if the fuzzer is run 2x, 5x, or 10x longer?
We choose this particular interval because it does not seem quite obvious how the coverage would develop.
Several hours into the fuzzing campaign, the general trend appears more predictable, which is why we can
increase the extrapolation intervals from minutes to hours in Table 1.
researcher benefits tremendously from a measure such as path coverage when judging the progress
of the fuzzing campaign towards completion.
We estimate the path coverage Gˆ after n test inputs were generated as follows
Gˆ(n) = S(n)
/(
S(n) + n − 1
n
f 21
2f2
)
where the denominator is the Chao1 estimator [15] of species richness (i.e., of the total number
of paths), S(n) is the current number of paths discovered, f1 is the number of singletons, f2 > 0
is the number of doubletons, and n is the number of test inputs generated. Path coverage can be
estimated very efficiently and scalably (i.e., independent of the size of the fuzzed program). In fact,
AFL only needs to maintain the number of singletons f1 and doubletons f2 (Figure 2). Empirically,
we find that the accuracy of the estimate increases as the number of generated inputs increases.
2.3 Extrapolating the Completeness of the Fuzzing Campaign
In automated software testing, we lack methodologies to predict how much more code coverage can
be achieved if the fuzzer is run only for so much longer. In other words, we lack estimators of return
on investment. For instance, Figure 5.a shows the statement coverage that AFL has achieved one
minute into the fuzzing campaign.7 Even from the plot, the reader may find it difficult to estimate
whether the coverage will remain at 60% or continue to increase to 70% within the next minute
(i.e., at 2 minutes). In the following we show how estimators from ecology can be used within our
STADS framework to extrapolate statement coverage if more resources were invested.
So far, we have defined species based on the path that an input exercises, and whether it crashes
or not. In the following, we allow an input to belong to multiple species where the set of species
for an input t is given by the program statements that t covers. In our motivating example, the
code coverage tool gcov [105] forms the dynamic analysis that identifies the statements covered by
an input. Notice that statement coverage is just another kind of species coverage.
Figure 5.b shows the extrapolation of the statement coverage within the first ten minutes of the
fuzzing campaign. The statement coverage is forecasted to increase by nine (9) percentage points if
the security researcher invests nine times more minutes into the fuzzing campaign. Normally, Chao
and Jost [23] would suggest to extrapolate only within twice the sample size (i.e., up to twice the
length of the current fuzzing campaign). However, in this case the extrapolation is fairly accurate
7We measured statement coverage with using gcov as a proportion of all executable statements.
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Table 1. Extrapolating the statement coverage of libjpeg-turbo at various points T into the fuzzing campaign
for various times T ′ in the future. The bias of our estimate can be computed as the difference between the
extrapolated with the empirical value of the statement coverage at time T ′.
Statistical Extrapolation
Current Empirical Future Extrapolated Empirical
Time T Cov. @ T Time T ′ Cov. @ T ′ Cov. @ T ′
1 min 61.5% 2 min 62.7% 65.9%
1 min 61.5% 5 min 66.3% 67.1%
1 min 61.5% 10 min 71.5% 70.5%
10 min 70.5% 15 min 71.7% 83.3%
10 min 70.5% 30 min 75.1% 83.7%
1 hour 87.2% 90 min 87.4% 87.5%
1 hour 87.2% 2 hours 87.6% 87.6%
10 hours 96.6% 15 hours 96.7% 96.7%
10 hours 96.6% 20 hours 96.9% 97.1%
1 day 97.1% 1.5 days 97.2% 97.2%
1 day 97.1% 2 days 97.8% 98.6%
even within ten times the sample size as we can see by overlaying the empirical values in Figure 5.c.
Table 1 shows more estimates of the statement coverage in the future. Despite the extrapolation up
to 24 hours into the future, the coverage estimate is within ±1 percentage points of the empirical
value in eight out of eleven cases. Between 10 and 15 minutes, there is a sudden coverage increase
by 12 percentage points that is explained by the adaptive sampling of AFL. The extrapolation was
not able to forecast this sudden increase. Otherwise, our computed estimates are all fairly accurate.
Given that n test inputs have been generated and S(n) of S statements have been covered in the
fuzzing campaign, within the STADS framework we extrapolate the number of covered statements
S(n +m∗) whenm∗ more test inputs have been generated as follows [23]
Sˆ(n +m∗) = S(n) + Qˆ0
[
1 −
(
1 − Q1
nQˆ0 +Q1
)m∗ ]
where Qˆ0 = S − S(n) is the number of uncovered statements and Q1 is the number of statements
that are executed by exactly one generated test input. Since AFL only needs to maintain Q1 (in
addition to S , S(n), and n), code coverage can be extrapolated very efficiently and scalably (i.e.,
independent of the size of the fuzzed program). The accuracy decreases asm∗ increases. However,
a 95%-confidence interval that allows to assess the decrease of accuracy is available via statistical
bootstrapping [23].
Note that the STADS statistical framework also allows us to extrapolate other quantities such as
discovery probability and other kinds of species coverage.
3 AUTOMATED SOFTWARE TESTING AND ANALYSIS AS DISCOVERY OF SPECIES
In the following we present our statistical framework of automated software testing and analysis
as discovery of species (STADS). Let P be the program that we wish to fuzz. We call as P’s input
spaceD the set of all inputs that P can take. As inputs, we consider command line parameters, files,
event sequences, messages, data streams, data bases, but also other objects that impact program
behavior that are not normally considered inputs, such as environment variables, configuration,
values returned from system calls, thread schedules, and so on. Let F be a stochastic process that
samples inputs t ∈ D . We call F fuzzer and the sampling of inputs test input generation.
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3.1 Search Space of the Fuzzer
Most fuzzers operate on a restricted search space D ′ ⊆ D such that F is effectively unable to
generate all inputs that P can take. For instance, a fuzzer might generate test inputs that are “valid”
w.r.t. a pre-specified input model [82]; yet, there might be programs that exhibit a vulnerability
only for an invalid input. A fuzzer might generate inputs only up to a certain maximum size; yet,
there might be programs that exhibit a vulnerability only for substantially larger test inputs. Hence,
the test inputs that are generated within a fuzzing campaign are necessarily random only within
the capabilities of the fuzzer. For instance, the search space for CSmith [129] is a subset of all C
programs (rather than a random sequence of UTF8-characters).
Hence, estimates that are derived from methodologies in the STADS framework hold only w.r.t.
the fuzzer’s search space and the tested program P. The search space is specified either explicitly by
the input model, grammar, or protocol that is used (and/or induced [59]) during fuzzing to reduce
the fuzzer’s search space [2, 45, 82], or implicitly by the fuzzer’s inherent limitations to generate
certain inputs. Most fuzzers do not also fuzz a program’s environment (OS, architecture, current
date, etc.), further restricting the behaviors that P can exhibit when fuzzed by F .
In ecology, the sampling might also operate on a restricted search space [67]. For instance, certain
areas may not be accessible. A net may not trap species smaller than its mesh. A light trap may not
lure light-insensitive species.
3.2 Species Identification
Suppose, the fuzzer’s search spaceD ′ can be subdivided into S individual subdomains {Di }Si=1,
called species. All inputs belong to at least one species and multiple inputs can belong to the same
species. Specifically, all inputs belong to the same species that share the same discrete property of
the program P. For instance, we could consider each input that covers the same program statement
to belong to the same species. Depending on the specific objective (e.g., “Cover all statements!”),
we can choose a suitable species identification, and devise a sampling strategy that can discover a
maximal number of species. The concrete fuzzing objective is thus encoded by the way the species
is identified for a certain input.
In our STADS framework, a dynamic analysis identifies the specific species to which a generated
test input belongs. For C programs, the gcov coverage-tool [105] identifies the statements and
branches an input covers; the AFL-instrumentation [98] identifies the specific path an input
exercises; or AddressSanitizer [89] identifies the type of vulnerability an input exposes. Notice,
some objectives require the dynamic analysis to identify a single species for each input (e.g., the
path an input exercises) while others require to identify multiple species for a single input (e.g., the
statements an input covers). Notice also, we require deterministic execution: The same input, executed
an arbitrary number of times, must always belong to the same species. However, conceptually we
can integrate non-deterministic programs by considering all potential non-deterministic actions as
part of the program’s input space. For instance, a test input for a concurrent program also specifies
a specific thread-interleaving. A test input for an interactive program (e.g., an Android app) also
specifies a state it must start from.
3.3 Fuzzing Campaigns
The fuzzer F generates n test inputs and is said to discover a speciesDi whenDi is sampled for the
first time. The general fuzzing objective is then to discover a maximal number of species. Let pi be
the probability with which F samples species Di for i : 1 ≤ i ≤ S at any point during the fuzzing
campaign. Note that the STADS framework fully accounts for arbitrary fuzzer heuristics, including
the sampling from the operational distribution [128], as long as the fuzzer does not change the
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sampling strategy adaptively throughout the fuzzing campaign. For instance, if a fuzzer generates
more “typical” program inputs by sampling from the program’s operational distribution—because
the software engineer deems the detection of bugs that could also be found by a customer as more
important—then all statistical claims derived from the STADS framework strictly hold w.r.t. that
fuzzer within the stipulated confidence bounds. This fuzzer is simply more likely (greater pi ) to
discover an “operational” bug Di than a fuzzer without that heuristic, for all fuzzing campaigns.
Within our statistical framework we must assume that the relative species abundances p = {pi }Si=1
does not substantially change during the fuzzing campaign. However, in practice this assumption
might not hold. We say that (feedback-directed) fuzzers where p changes during the fuzzing
campaign have an adaptive sampling bias. For instance, a coverage-directed fuzzer retains generated
test inputs that previously discovered a new species, and fuzzes those in addition to the initially
provided seeds [98]. This allows to sample a “neighboring” species Di with a greater probability
pi (thus also increasing the efficiency of the fuzzer [9]). Yet, the rate at which new species are
discovered is consistently decelerating throughout a fuzzing campaign. Hence, the rate at which
the probabilities pi change is also decelerating and the magnitude of the change decreases such
that the adaptive bias reduces as more test inputs are generated. We investigate the adaptive bias
empirically in Section 6 and provide an extended discussion in Section 9.5.
Within our STADS statistical framework, we do not assume that the fuzzer has any information
about the species identification. Specifically, the “location” and relative abundance pi of a specific
(undiscovered) species Di as well as the total number of inputs N and the total number of species
S are a-priori unknown. Within a single fuzzing campaign, the fuzzer generates n test inputs and
discovers S(n) species. A species Di is discovered when F generates the first test input t that
belongs to Di , i.e., t ∈ Di . During a fuzzing campaign, the fuzzer generates Xi test inputs that
belong to species Di , ∑Si=1Xi = n. Only species where Xi > 0 are marked as discovered.
There are two pertinent measures that characterize a program. The species richness S quantifies
the total number of species, such as the number of statements, paths, vulnerabilities, information
flows, et cetera, in the program. In contrast, the species evenness J quantifies how “even” the relative
abundances p are distributed. Formally, we compute species evenness J using Pielou’s evenness
index [83],
J =
H
Hmax
where H = −
S∑
i=1
pi lnpi is Shannon’s diversity index (1)
and Hmax = ln S is the max. possible value of H (2)
Note that 0 ≤ J ≤ 1. Shannon’s diversity index is also known as Shannon entropy. Both quantities
S and J can be illustrated by the following example. In Case#1, half of all inputs might exercise one
path while another half might exercise another. In Case#2, 90% of all inputs might exercise one path
and only 10% another. Both cases have the same total number of paths (S1 = S2 = 2) but feature a
very different evenness (J1 = 1, J2 = 0.47). The asymptotic total number of species S is important
to determine how many more species we can expect to discover in a fuzzing campaign. The species
evenness J is important to choose the right testing tool. If J is very low, symbolic execution-based
fuzzers [14, 30] might be more appropriate than random fuzzers [98, 117].8
There are two pertinent measures that characterize a fuzzing campaign, species coverage and
discovery probability. We define as species coverage G the proportion of species that have been
discovered after generating n test inputs,
G(n) = S(n)
S
(3)
8For an extended discussion of blackbox versus whitebox testing efficiency, see Böhme and Paul [7].
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Examples of species coverage are path coverage in our motivating example, where the total number
of species S is not known and must be estimated, and code coverage, where S is indeed known.
We define as discovery probability U the proportion of inputs that belong to species that remain
undiscovered after generating n test inputs,
U (n) = 1 −
∑S
i=1 pi I (Xi > 0)∑S
i=1 pi
=
∑S
i=1 pi I (Xi = 0)∑S
i=1 pi
(4)
where I (A) is the indicator function, i.e., I (A) = 1 if the event A occurs, and I (A) = 0 otherwise.
We define as sample coverage C the complement of the discovery probability. In ecology, the
sample coverage is the proportion of individuals in the assemblage whose species is represented in
the sample. In automated software testing, it essentially quantifies the proportion of (tested and
untested) program inputs that stress program behaviors that have already been tested before. In
Section 4.1 we show that the estimate Uˆ of the discovery probability provides an upper bound
on the probability to expose a vulnerability, whence the sample coverage estimate measures the
confidence that a fuzzing campaign inspires in the correctness of the program. The sample coverage
that is achieved in a fuzzing campaign depends on the species evenness J and the number of test
inputs n that are generated. Intuitively, the lower the evenness, the more test inputs n a fuzzing
campaign must generate to expect a reasonably high sample coverage C .
3.4 Main Hypothesis
I hypothesize that within the STADS statistical framework the rare species which have been
discovered throughout a fuzzing campaign explain the species within the fuzzer’s search space
that remain undiscovered. Intuitively, it is the difficulty to discover a rare species, measured by the
total number of test inputs that needed to be generated before discovering the rare species, that
provides insights on the difficulty of discovering yet undetected (but detectable) species.
Main Hypothesis. Almost all information about number and relative abundance of undiscovered
species within the fuzzer’s search space is in the number and relative abundance of rare species that
have already been discovered.
A species Di is considered rare if 1 ≤ Xi ≤ κ, where κ is an arbitrary but very small constant. In
fact, almost all estimators and extrapolators presented in this article are functions of the number of
singleton and doubleton species (i.e., κ = 2).
The same hypothesis is underpinning the nonparametric biostatistics in ecology. Chao and Chui
argue that “[..] abundant species (which are certain to be detected in samples) contain almost no
information about the undetected species richness, whereas rare species (which are likely to be
either undetected or infrequently detected) contain almost all the information about the undetected
species richness” [17]. Therefore, most nonparametric estimators and extrapolators are based on
counts of rare species. In order to test the main hypothesis, we need to establish the accuracy of
these estimators and extrapolators within the STADS framework.
This hypothesis is the reason for the great scalability of the STADS framework. For most estimates,
the fuzzer needs to record only the number of rare species that have been discovered. Hence, the
computation of the estimates scales easily to very large programs in our experiments.
3.5 The Multinomial Model: One Input, Single Species
Some concrete fuzzing objectives require to identify a single species for each input. For instance, an
input can execute only one path [46], exercise only one method call sequence, compute only one
final output [85], crash only at one program location; a single input either exposes a vulnerability or
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does not expose a vulnerability. In ecology, one individual can also belong only to a single species.
A researcher samples individuals from the assemblage at various random locations and records for
each detected species the number of occurrences. When individuals are sampled, ecologists call
the collected data as abundance data and utilize the multinomial model [33, 61]. In the multinomial
model, within STADS a generated test input is considered as individual.9
Define the abundance frequency count fk as the number of species that contain exactly k test
inputs which were generated throughout the current fuzzing campaign, 0 ≤ k ≤ n. More formally,
fk =
∑S
i=1 I (Xi = k), where I (A) is the indicator function, i.e., I (A) = 1 if event A occurs and
I (A) = 0 otherwise. Hence, n = ∑nk=1 k fk and S(n) = ∑nk=1 fk . The abundance frequency count f0
represents the number of undiscovered species. We call f1 the number of singleton species and f2 the
number of doubleton species. The input space contains S non-overlapping subdomains, where the
probability that the fuzzer generates a test input that belongs to species Di is pi for i : 1 ≤ i ≤ S .
Note that
∑S
i=1 pi = 1. The multinomial probability distribution has the probability mass function
P(X1 = x1, . . . ,XS = xS ) = n!
x1! . . . xS !
px11 p
x2
2 . . .p
xS
S (5)
From Equation 5, we can see that the number of generated test inputs Xi that belong to species
Di is a sufficient statistic, meaning that no other statistic which can be calculated from the same
sample provides any additional information as to the value of the (estimated) parameter. This
renders the abundance frequency counts fk , which are defined fromXi , suitable components for the
estimators and extrapolators of fuzzing progress. As Colwell et al. [33] point out, the multinomial
model assumes that the sampling procedure itself does not substantially alter the probabilities
(p1,p2, . . . ,pS ). The authors provide more details about the multinomial model and its utility in the
ecologic context. The case where multiple species can be identified for a single input is explained
by the Bernoulli product model [20] and discussed in Section 7.
4 ESTIMATING RESIDUAL RISK AND CAMPAIGN COMPLETENESS
Our model of software testing and analysis as discovery of species (STADS) provides access to a rich
statistical framework in ecology. This unexpected connection between two otherwise unrelated
fields of research provisions software testing with methodologies to accurately estimate how much
we have seen and to extrapolate from the seen to the unseen. In this section, we focus on the
estimation of how much has been tested and how much more there is. We show that an estimate of
the probability to discover a new species can provide a statistical guarantee that no (detectable)
vulnerability exists that has not already been discovered. Moreover, we present novel methodologies
to assess campaign completeness (i.e., the progress of an ongoing campaign towards completion).
4.1 Discovery Probability and Sample Completeness
In the STADS framework, the discovery probabilityU (n)measures the current probability to discover
a new species with the n + 1th generated test input where n is the number of test inputs that have
been generated throughout the current fuzzing campaign (i.e.,U (0) = 1). If the dynamic analysis is
able to identify vulnerabilities, then the discovery probabilityU provides a statistical guarantee that
no detectable vulnerability exists if none has been discovered. In other words, security researchers
can use the STADS statistical framework for residual risk assessment.
The concept of discovery probability might seem to require advance knowledge of the true
relative species abundance {pi }Si=1 during a fuzzing campaign. However, the discovery probability
9In Section 7, we extend the STADS framework to include the Bernoulli product model, where a generated test input is
considered as sampling unit. In the STADS framework, the Bernoulli model describes concrete fuzzing objectives that require
to identify one or more species for a single input.
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can be very accurately and efficiently estimated using only information contained in the single,
uncompleted fuzzing campaign itself, as long as the number of generated test inputs is reasonably
large [48, 87]. Hence, the concept of discovery probability finds application across many fields
of science, such as rare event estimation [78], cryptanalysis [47], computational linguistics [42],
biology [23], actuarial science, and so on.
In the STADS framework, the sample coverage C(n) = 1 −U (n) measures the probability that the
n + 1th generated test input belongs to an already discovered species. In other words, we know
the species for C% of program inputs in the fuzzer’s search space. Sample coverage also directly
measures sample completeness, i.e., how complete the sample is w.r.t. the remaining undiscovered
species in the assemblage. Hence, in ecology sample coverage is routinely used to choose the most
accurate estimator [11] and to compare attributes of species across assemblages [23]. In software
testing, sample coverage can also be used to to assess the progress of the current fuzzing campaign
towards completion without the need to estimate Sˆ the total number of species. If the fuzzer has
exposed no vulnerabilities, the sample coverage quantifies the degree of confidence that the fuzzing
campaign inspires in the correctness of the program.
The inverse of the discovery probability 1/U (n) gives the number of test inputs that we can expect
to generate before discovering a previously undiscovered species. Given the number of test inputs
generated per unit time ∆, we can derive the expected time until discovery as 1/(∆ ·U (n)).
Estimation in STADS. In the multinomial model, the Good-Turing estimator estimates the
probability to generate a test input that belongs to an undiscovered species. Thus, using the
Good-Turing estimator [48], the estimate of the discovery probability Uˆ (n) is obtained as
Uˆ (n) = f1
n
(6)
where f1 is the number of singletons and n is the total number of generated test inputs. According
to Good [47], the Good-Turing estimators were developed by Alan Turing during World War II
while breaking Enigma codes. Good and Turing showed that their estimator can be accurately and
efficiently computed only from the sample itself [48]. Moreover, the estimator is strongly consistent,
meaning that its accuracy strictly increases as the sample size (i.e., number of generated test inputs)
increases [93]. Zhang and Zhang [130] prove asymptotic normality of the Good-Turing estimator,
meaning that the convergence to the true value is also reasonably fast. Robbins [87] showed that
the mean squared error of the Good-Turing estimator is less than 1/n, which indicates that it is
quite accurate if n is large. In theory, it is assumed that the probability pi to sample a species Di
follows a binomial distribution. However, in practice the Good-Turing estimator seems to perform
close to the best natural estimator for any distribution [79].
Statistical Guarantee. We show that the Good-Turing estimate Uˆ (n) of the discovery probability
provides an upper bound on the probability that an error in the fuzzer’s search space remains
undiscovered given that no error has been exposed after generating n test inputs.10 Depending
on the dynamic analysis, the fuzzer’s search space is partitioned by the species identified for
each input. Inputs that belong to the same species share the same input subdomain. Suppose,
the progress-based dynamic analysis partitions the input space according to the concrete fuzzing
objective (e.g., based on the path or the statements that are exercised as in our motivating example).
There are S subdomains A = {Di }Si=1 in the fuzzer’s search space. Further suppose, an error-
based dynamic analysis partitions the same search space into T subdomains B = {Ej }Tj=1. A
partitioning is error-based if all inputs that belong to the same species homogeneously either do
or do not expose an error [7]. One could imagine error-based partitioning as black and white
10A vulnerability is just a special case of an error.
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regions in the restricted input space of the program, where the black regions contain inputs that
expose an error. In practice, a dynamic analysis, such as ASAN [89], would identify some test
input executions that expose an error. Hence, the statistical guarantees hold modulo the dynamic
analyzer’s capability to identify a error-exposing input.11 Let a combined dynamic analysis be
derived by intersecting the progress- and error-based partitioning. The joint partitioning yields
R species AB = {Di ⋂ Ej | Di ∈ A, Ej ∈ B}/∅, where ·/· is the difference operation to remove
“empty” species and R ≤ S +T . Notice that the number of singletons f1 and doubletons f2 for the
progress-based analysis A are also the number of singletons and doubletons for the combined
analysis AB. Assuming that no error has been exposed throughout the fuzzing campaign, all
error-exposing species inAB are clearly still among the undiscovered ones. Since the estimateU of
the discovery probability denotes the proportion of inputs that belong to undiscovered species for
AB (and A), it provides an upper bound on the proportion of inputs exposing an error. A similar
argument can be constructed trivially for the Bernoulli product model. ■
Quantifying Accuracy. In the STADS framework, approximate estimators of the variance and
the associated confidence interval can be derived with an asymptotic approach [25, 130]. We also
note that one must account for the resulting missing probability mass when estimating the relative
species abundance pi for each discovered species Di , e.g., to estimate species evenness J [83]. In
the multinomial model, the estimator pˆi = Xi/n would evidently over-estimate pi . This can be
remedied with an approach called smoothing [42, 48].
Scalability. In practice, the computation of the discovery probability estimate Uˆ (n) is efficient
and easily scales with program size (i.e., with #species S). The fuzzer needs to store information only
about doubleton and singleton species in addition to the number of generated test inputs and the
number of discovered species. In the statistical programming language R, the goodTuring-function
of the edgeR-package [88] implements Good-Turing estimationwhile the goodTuringProportions-
function implements the Good-Turing smoothing procedure. The spadeR- and iNext-packages
[25, 60] for R compute the improved discovery probability estimator. The iNext-package also
provides 95%-confidence intervals.
4.2 Species Coverage
In ecology, species richness measures the number of species in the assemblage. In the STADS model,
we define species coverage as the proportion of species in the assemblage that have been discovered
throughout the fuzzing campaign. Hence, with an estimate of species richness Sˆ we can compute
the current species coverage Gˆ(n) = S(n)/Sˆ to assess the current progress of the fuzzing campaign
towards completion. At the basis of most estimators is the observation that the species discovery
curve decelerates over time as the number n of generated test input increases [7]. At the beginning
of the fuzzing campaign many species are discovered in a short time. Later, it takes more and more
time to discover the next undiscovered species. For our motivating example, this deceleration can
be observed in Figure 4. In fact, the discovery curve appears to approach an asymptote which is
estimated at 5408 paths (using the Chao1-estimator [15]). The asymptotic total number of species
is our estimation target. In the following, we review various estimators Sˆ . We refer to Colwell et al.
[33] for a more extensive review of available methodologies. An empirical and simulation-based
comparison of several estimators was conducted by Hortal et al. [58].
During their investigations of the species discovery curve in what we now call the STADS model,
Böhme and Paul [7] suggest fitting an exponential curve to extrapolate how many species we
11Similarly, in software verification the formal guarantees are valid only modulo the provided specification. However, like a
dynamic analysis in software testing, a specification may be incomplete (i.e., does not allow to detect all vulnerabilities;
a.k.a. false negatives) or incorrect (i.e., reports vulnerabilities when there is none; a.k.a. false positives).
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can expect to discover in a given time budget. Curve fitting would also allow us to determine the
asymptotic total number of species [34, 84]. However, curve fitting approaches are not based on
any statistical sampling model which prevents us from effectively evaluating the variance of the
resulting asymptote. Moreover, different functional forms may manifest the same goodness of
fit but yield vastly different estimates of the asymptote which calls into question the statistical
soundness of this approach.
Sampling-theory-based approaches build upon a statistical foundation and can be broadly dis-
tinguished into parametric and non-parametric frameworks [68]. In the parametric framework,
it is assumed that the relative species abundances {pi }Si=1 follow a statistical model with one or
two parameters (e.g., Poisson process [41]). However, parametric models usually require extensive
numerical procedures and work well only when the correct distribution is already known [31]. Yet,
in software testing and analysis, just like in ecology, the distribution is often unknown. The most
effective estimators of the total number of species are sampling-theory-based and non-parametric
[18]. Here, we can distinguish Jacknife, coverage-based, and Chao1/2-type estimators.
Jackknife estimators were developed to reduce the bias of a biased estimator and allow to compute
variance and confidence intervals for the estimate [13, 81, 95]. The current number of discovered
species S(n) is obviously a negatively biased estimator of the total number of species S . In the
multinomial model of the STADS framework, the first-order jackknife estimator Sˆ jk1 corrects this
bias by assuming that the number of undiscovered species equals the number of singletons f1
Sˆ jk1 = S(n) + n − 1
n
f1 (7)
≈ S(n) + f1 (8)
In the multinomial model of the STADS framework, the second-order jackknife estimator Sˆ jk2 for
which the estimated number of unseen species is in terms of singletons and doubletons has the
form
Sˆ jk2 = S(n) + 2n − 3
n
f1 − (n − 2)
2
n(n − 1) f2 (9)
≈ S(n) + 2f1 − f2 (10)
Burnham and Overton [13] provide higher orders of the jackknife estimators. All Jacknife estimators
can be expressed as linear combinations of frequencies and thus variances can be obtained.
Chao1-type estimators provide a lower bound for the total number of species rather than a
point estimate [15]. When there are a large number of undiscovered species, it will be statistically
impossible to obtain a good estimate of species richness. Hence, a good lower bound is often more
practical than an imprecise point estimate. Chao [15] derived such a lower bound called Chao1 for
the multinomial model:
SˆChao1 =
{
S(n) + n−1n
f 21
2f2 if f2 > 0
S(n) + n−1n f1(f1 − 1)/2 if f2 = 0
(11)
≈
{
S(n) + f 21 /(2f2) if f2 > 0
S(n) + f1(f1 − 1)/2 if f2 = 0
(12)
where in the current fuzzing campaign n is the total number of test inputs generated, S(n) is the
total number of species discovered, and f1 and f2 are the abundance frequency counts for singleton
and doubleton species, respectively.
Very recently, Chao et al. [19] showed that SˆChao1 is an unbiased point estimator as long as very
rare species (i.e., undetected and singleton species) have approximately equal relative abundance. If
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very rare species are unevenly distributed and the sample size is not sufficiently large, the available
data do not contain sufficient information, and it is only reasonable to provide a good lower bound
estimate of species richness S .
An improved lower bound can be obtained from tripleton and quadrupleton species, respectively.
Chui et al. [31] derived the improved lower bound called iChao1 for the multinomial model:
SˆiChao1 = SˆChao1 +
n − 3
n
f3
4f4
×max
(
f1 − n − 3
n − 1
f2 f3
2f4
, 0
)
(13)
≈ SˆChao1 + f34f4 ×max
(
f1 − f2 f32f4 , 0
)
(14)
where f3 and f4 are the frequency counts for tripleton and quadrupleton species, respectively.
Coverage-based estimators utilize sample coverage, the proportion of inputs belonging to discov-
ered species, to estimate the total number of species [24, 31]. As we have seen earlier, sample cover-
age, as the complement of the discovery probability, can be very accurately and efficiently estimated
from the frequency counts alone, as long as the number of test inputs generated in the fuzzing cam-
paign is reasonably large [48]. As Chao and Chiu [18] point out, coverage-based estimators might
be appropriate when there are many rare species, i.e., where 0 ≪ |{pi | pi ≪ 1S , 1 ≤ i ≤ S}| ≲ S
and | · | gives the cardinality of the set. However, for the lack of space we are adjourning to future
work the discussion and evaluation of the ACE and ACE-1 estimators [24, 27].
Species coverage. In the STADS framework, we compute the estimate Gˆ of the species coverage
that has been achieved in the campaign by dividing the number of currently discovered species
S(n) by the estimated total number of species Sˆ . If S is known, then Sˆ = S . For instance, in our
motivating example path coverage is computed w.r.t. an estimated total number of species while
statement coverage is computed w.r.t. the known total number of statements. Both, statement
and path coverage are examples of species coverage, only that the same inputs are assigned to a
different kind of species.
Quantifying accuracy. The variance and 95%-confidence intervals for the estimators in the
STADS framework can be derived by the standard statistical approximation method [16] or using
bootstrapping [20]. Hortal et al. [58] find that estimator accuracy strongly depends on the species
evenness J and on the completeness C = 1 − U of the sample. Effectively, the accuracy of the
estimate improves as the discovery probabilityU decreases or species evenness J increases.
Scalability. In practice, the computation of all sampling-theoretic, non-parametric estimators of
species coverage is efficient and easily scales with program size (i.e., with #species S). In most cases,
the fuzzer needs to store information only about doubleton and singleton species in addition to the
number of generated test inputs and discovered species.In the statistical programming language R,
the ChaoSpecies-function of the SpadeR-package [25] implements several estimators of the total
number of species. The ChaoSpecies-function also reports 95%-confidence intervals.
5 EXTRAPOLATION OF SPECIES DISCOVERY
An extrapolation allows to assess the trade-off between investing more time and gaining more
insight. We discuss novel methodologies from ecology to quantify this return on investment.
Specifically, using extrapolation in the model of software testing and analysis as discovery of
species (STADS), the security researcher can answer the following questions.
(1) Given in the current fuzzing campaign n test inputs have been generated and the researcher
has time to generate onlym∗ more test inputs, how much species coverage Gˆ(n +m∗) and
residual risk Uˆ (n +m∗) can she expect to achieve?
21
(2) Given in the current fuzzing campaign n test inputs have been generated and the security
researcher would like to achieve a specific species coverageG∗, how many more test inputs
mG∗ can she expect to generate before achieving G∗ (i.e.,mG∗ s.t. Gˆ(n +mG∗ ) = G∗)?
Using these extrapolators, a security researcher can make an informed decision whether to continue
or abort a fuzzing campaign. Suppose, the client requires a statistical guarantee (i.e., discovery
probability) of 10−8 as upper bound of the probability that the fuzzer finds a vulnerability in the
program. The researcher can estimate the effort that is required to achieve that degree of confidence
in the correctness of the program.
5.1 Estimating Progress Towards Completion within a Given Time Budget
In our STADS statistical framework, there are several estimators of the expected number Sˆ(n +m∗)
of discovered species if the reference sample of size n was augmented bym∗ > 0 more individuals
(i.e., ifm∗ more test inputs were generated) [36, 49, 90, 91]. Chao and Jost [23] provide an overview.
In the multinomial model, Shen et al. [90] proposed the following sampling-theoretic extrapolator
based on the asymptotic total number of species:
Sˆ(n +m∗) = S(n) + fˆ0
1 −
(
1 − f1
n fˆ0 + f1
)m∗ (15)
where for the current fuzzing campaign, n is the number of generated test inputs, S(n) is the number
of discovered species, fˆ0 = Sˆ − S(n) is the expected number of undiscovered species, and f1 is the
number of singletons.
The rule of thumb is to keep the extrapolation within twice the sample size (i.e.,m∗ ≤ n) [33].
However, recently Orlitzki et al. (2016) [80] introduced the provable extrapolation of the discovered
species form∗ all the way up to n · [log(n) − 1] additional test inputs. This shows that the number
of discovered species can be estimated for a population log(n) times larger than that observed. The
authors go on to show that this is also the largest possible estimation range and that the estimators’
mean-square error is optimal up to constants for anym∗.
In the multinomial model of the STADS framework, we can derive the expected discovery
probability Uˆ (n +m∗) ifm∗ more test inputs were generated by recognizing that the discovery
probability is only the difference in the number of discovered species between this and the next
generated test inputU (n) = S(n + 1) − S(n). Hence,
Uˆ (n +m∗) = Sˆ(n +m∗ + 1) − Sˆ(n +m∗) (16)
=
f1
n
(
n fˆ0
n fˆ0 + f1
)m∗+1
(17)
where fˆ0 = Sˆ − S(n) is the expected number of undiscovered species, f1 is the number of singleton
species, and f2 is the number of doubleton species.
Quantifying accuracy. In the STADS model, confidence intervals for the estimators Sˆ(n +m∗)
and Uˆ (n+m∗) can be derived using the bootstrap method [23, 33]. In ecology, the rule of thumb is to
keep the extrapolation within twice the sample size (i.e.,m∗ ≤ n) [33]. The reason can be illustrated
with the following example. Intuitively, the accuracy of Sˆ(n + 10) is better when n = 1000 than
it is when n = 1. Firstly, the extrapolator performs better at n = 1000 because more information
is available. Secondly, the margin of error is also reduced because the species discovery curve
decelerates substantially (cf. Figure 4.a).
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Scalability. In practice, the extrapolation of species coverage Gˆ = Sˆ(n + m∗)/Sˆ and of the
discovery probability Uˆ (n +m∗) is efficient and easily scales with program size (i.e., with #species
S). The fuzzer needs to store information only about doubleton and singleton species in addition to
the number of generated test inputs n and the number of discovered species S(n). In the statistical
programming languageR, the iNext-package [60, 107] computes the extrapolation and also provides
95%-confidence intervals.
5.2 Estimating Number of Inputs Needed to Discover a Given Proportion of Species
Chao et al. [21] developed a non-parametric method for estimating the number of further test inputs
that would need to be generated in order to achieve an arbitrary species coverage G∗. Formally, to
reach a fractionG∗ of estimated total number of species Sˆ where Gˆ(n) < G∗ < 1, in the multinomial
model of the STADS framework the required numbermG∗ of further test inputs is estimated as
mG∗ ≈ nf12f2 log
[
fˆ0
(1 −G∗)Sˆ
]
(18)
where in the current fuzzing campaign n is the number of generated test inputs, S(n) is the number
of discovered species, fˆ0 = Sˆ − S(n) is an estimate of the number of undiscovered species, and f1
and f2 are the abundance frequency counts for singleton and doubleton species, respectively.
Accuracy. In the STADS model, confidence intervals for the estimators can be derived using
the bootstrap method [21]. Given the estimate Gˆ(n) of current species coverage, we suggest that
Gˆ(n) ≤ G∗ ≤ 0.5+ Gˆ(n)2 to keep the accuracy within a reasonable range. This suggestion is a variant
of the rule of thumb stated in Section 5.1 thatmG∗ ≤ n [33].
Scalability. In practice, computing mG∗ is efficient and easily scales with program size (i.e.,
with #species S). The fuzzer needs to store information only about doubletons and singletons
in addition to the number of generated test inputs and discovered species. The logarithm of a
32bit-floating point number in Equation 32 can be computed efficiently with a typecast, a bit shift,
and a subtraction operation [122]. All other basic mathematical operations require one CPU step
each. In the statistical programming language R, the number of test inputs required to discover
a certain proportion of all species can be estimated with the num.samples.required-function in
the sprex-package [119].
6 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
6.1 Research Objectives
The main objectives of this preliminary empirical evaluation are
(1) to test my main hypothesis that within the model of automated software testing and analysis as
discovery of species (STADS) the rare species which have been discovered throughout a fuzzing
campaign explain the species within the fuzzer’s search space that remain undiscovered.
(2) to evaluate ecologic estimators and predictors for the multinomial model in STADS. Specifically,
we evaluate the Chao1 estimator Sˆ of species richness [15], the predictor Sˆ(n +m∗) by Shen,
Chao, and Feng [90] of the number of species that would be discovered ifm∗ more test inputs
were generated, and the Good-Turing estimator Uˆ (n) [48] of the discovery probability.
(3) to investigate the impact of the adaptive sampling bias of a feedback-directed fuzzer. An
underlying assumption of most methodologies in the STADS framework is that the probability
pi to generate a test input that belongs to species Di does not change substantially during the
fuzzing campaign. However, it does for feedback-directed fuzzers, such as AFL.
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We use path coverage as one kind of species coverage (i) because path coverage is the main measure
of progress for our extension of AFL [98] (see Section 2), the fuzzer used for our experiments,
and (ii) because path coverage satisfies the conditions of the multinomial model (one species per
input). We employ the Chao1-estimator [15] to estimate the asymptotic total number of paths
Sˆ and the Good-Turing-estimator [48] to estimate the discovery probability. We estimate path
coverage as Gˆ(n) = S(n)/Sˆ . To extrapolate the number of paths discovered in the subsequent
fixed-time interval, we compute the average number of tests generated per unit time and leverage
the sampling-theoretic estimator Sˆ(n +m∗) proposed by Shen et al. [90]. For our evaluation, we use
established measures of estimator accuracy. The bias of an estimator measures the mean difference
of the estimate to the true value of the estimation target while the precision measures the variance
of the estimates. Specifically, we ask the following research questions:
RQ.1 Can path coverage Gˆ(n) be used to effectively estimate the progress of a fuzzing campaign
towards completion? Do different programs achieve the same path coverage, say 6 or 48
hours into the fuzzing campaign?
RQ.2 Can discovery probability Uˆ (n) be used to effectively estimate the residual risk of leaving
detectable vulnerabilities undetected? Is the estimate representative for different fuzzing
campaigns of similar length?
RQ.3 How biased is the Chao1-estimator Sˆ of the total number of paths? Is Sˆ systematically
positively or negatively biased? What is the bias’ magnitude and how can it be corrected?
RQ.4 How precise is the Chao1-estimator Sˆ of the total number of paths? How can the precision of
Sˆ be increased?
RQ.5 How biased is the extrapolation of the number of discovered paths Sˆ(n +m∗) ifm∗ more
inputs were generated, wherem∗ is the number of test inputs that we can expect to generate
in 30 minutes, 1 hour, 2 hours, or 4 hours? Is Sˆ(n+m∗) systematically positively or negatively
biased? What is the magnitude of the bias and how can it be corrected? Does the rule of
thumb [33] to keep the extrapolation within twice the sampling effort apply to automated
software testing and analysis?
RQ.6 How precise is the extrapolation of the number of discovered paths Sˆ(n +m∗) ifm∗ more
inputs were generated, wherem∗ is the number of test inputs that we can expect to generate
in 30 minutes, 1 hour, 2 hours, or 4 hours? How can the precision of Sˆ(n +m∗) be increased?
We present a summary of our results w.r.t. our main objectives in Section 6.5.
6.2 Setup and Infrastructure
Implementation.We implemented the pertinent estimators and extrapolators into American Fuzzy
Lop (AFL) [98]; we call our tool Pythia. Pythia uses lightweight instrumentation to determine,
with negligible performance overhead, a unique identifier for the path that is exercised by an input.
New inputs are generated by mutating a seed input using bit flips, boundary values, and block
deletion and insertion strategies. If the new input exercises a new branch, or exercises a previously
exercised branch exponentially more (or less often), it is added to the fuzzer’s queue. Pythia stores
for each seed in the queue the path-id and the number of generated test inputs that yield the same
path-id. About every five (5) seconds, Pythia writes to a file the pertinent fuzzer data, including
the current unix time, the number of generated test inputs n, the number of discovered paths S(n),
and the number of singletons f1 and doubletons f2 (i.e., #paths exercised once or twice).
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Table 2. Subjects: Four security-critical open-source C projects of different program sizes.
Program Size Test Driver Description
json [108] 44 kLOC parse_msgpack JSON parser
libjpeg-turbo [110] 91 kLOC libjpeg_turbo_fuzzer JPEG image library
openssl [115] 472 kLOC server cryptography and SSL/TLS library
libxml2 [111] 500 kLOC xmlint -d XML parser
ffmpeg [104] 1071 kLOC AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4_fuzzer audio and video streaming library
wireshark [121] 3522 kLOC fuzzshark_media_type-json network protocol analyzer
Subjects. We chose six subject programs from Google’s OSSFuzz fuzzing infrastructure [116].
The infrastructure fully automates the fuzzing of the 50+ integrated open-source C projects. OSS-
Fuzz automatically downloads the most recent version of the subject, builds the subject, compiles
the test drivers, and provides the initial seed corpus. We integrated Pythia as fuzzer into the
fuzzing infrastructure. The list of subject programs used for our experiments is shown in Table 2.
We chose these subjects because they are all security-critical, well-fuzzed, and of different sizes.
Setup. For each subject we ran ten (10) fuzzing campaigns for 100 hours. The ten-fold repetition
of the fuzzing campaign allows us to discuss bias and precision of the estimators. The fuzzer was
started with the same set of seeds and targeted the same test driver (Col. 3 in Table 2). In total, we
spent a cumulative 6000 hours ≈ 8.2 months fuzzing these six subjects.
Estimator performance. Bias and precision are standard performance measures for estimators
and extrapolators in biostatistics and ecology [11, 94]. Bias quantifies the difference between the
estimate and the true value of the estimation target. A systematically positively or negatively biased
estimator consistently over- or under-estimates, respectively, the true value of the estimation target.
Precision quantifies the statistical variance of the estimator (i.e., how close repeated estimates of the
same quantity are to each other). An estimator with a low variance has a high precision, and vice
versa. Unlike bias, the magnitude of precision is only dependent on the estimated values and is
hence completely independent of the true value. Bias and precision are scaled w.r.t. the true value
of the estimation target. For instance, an estimator with a bias of zero (0) provides exactly the true
value of the estimation target, an estimator with a bias of negative one (-1) provides zero (0) as
estimate, and an estimator with a bias of one (1) provides exactly twice the true value.
6.3 Estimator Evaluation
We compute the mean bias of the estimator Sˆ of the total number of paths S as the average bias
over N = 10 runs and the imprecision of Sˆ as the standard deviation of the bias [11]:
mean bias =
N∑
i=1
Sˆi − Si
NS
(19)
imprecision =
√√√√ N∑
i=1
(
Sˆi − Si
Si
−
[∑N
j=1 Sˆ j − S j
]
NS
)2
N − 1 (20)
where Si is the estimated total number of paths for the ith run at 100 hours of fuzzing. Even at 100
hours, the empirical value may still substantially underestimate the true species richness. A low
imprecision means that all estimates are similarly (un)biased.
RQ.1 Completeness Gˆ(n). Path coverage provides a useful indicator of the progress of a fuzzing
campaign towards completion. Some programs require more time than others to achieve the same path
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Table 3. Average number of discovered paths Sobs and estimated path coverage Gˆ over ten runs at six,
forty-eight, and one-hundred hours into the fuzzing campaign, respectively.
Sobs (Gˆ) Sobs (Gˆ) Sobs (Gˆ)
Subject @ 6hrs @ 48hrs @ 100hrs
json 2612 (98.7%) 2657 (99.9%) 2665 (99.9%)
libjpeg-turbo 2224 (95.2%) 2547 (99.4%) 2623 (99.6%)
openssl 1041 (86.3%) 1356 (93.3%) 1444 (88.6%)
libxml2 5071 (57.3%) 6672 (67.3%) 7656 (66.0%)
ffmpeg 2420 (71.8%) 2554 (99.3%) 2568 (99.6%)
wireshark 427 (98.0%) 454 (99.1%) 456 (99.3%)
< 95% The campaign is considered incomplete.
< 98% Decide based on other factors.
≥ 98% The campaign is considered nearly complete.
coverage. Table 3 shows the estimated path coverage Gˆ(n) at 6, 48, and 100 hours into the fuzzing
campaign as an average over ten runs. Six hours into the fuzzing campaign, we see Gˆ = 99% for
json, meaning Pythia has discovered almost all paths that it could potentially explore. In fact,
after spending seven times more time (i.e., after 48 hours), Pythia has discovered only 45 more
paths. For all practical purposes the average fuzzing campaign for both json and wireshark might
be considered completed shortly after the six hour mark.
Clearly, openssl, libxml2, and ffmpeg do not appear to be completed at the six hour mark with a
path coverage well below 90%. In fact, more than 300, 1600, and 100 paths are still being discovered,
respectively, until the 48 hour mark. At the 48 hour mark, the average fuzzing campaign for ffmpeg
might be considered completed. In fact only 12 more paths are found until the 100 hour mark.
However, the average fuzzing campaign for libxml2, and openssl remains incomplete even at the 48
hour mark. Indeed, about 1k , and 100 more paths are being discovered, respectively, until the 100
hour mark. For libxml2, about 3200 new paths are found until the 800 hour mark, on average (33
days; 10846 avg. #paths). We explain the decrease in coverage from the 48 to the 100 hour mark for
libxml2 and openssl with the lack of a discernible horizontal asymptote (2nd row in tables 4 and 5;
RQ.3). We also note that AFL’s existing stopping rule12 would have (incorrectly) aborted openssl
already at the 6 hour mark while ffmpeg would (incorrectly) continue even after the 48 hour mark.
RQ.2 Residual Risk Uˆ (n). The current discovery probability provides a useful indicator of the current
residual risk that a discoverable vulnerability exists but remains undiscovered in the ongoing fuzzing
campaign. The discovery probability measured for one fuzzing campaign is fairly representative for
other fuzzing campaigns of similar length, particularly later in the fuzzing campaign. The bottom
row in tables 4 and 5 shows the discovery probability estimate Uˆ (n) over time. Notice the log-scale
on the y-axis. The first observation that we can make is that fuzzing campaigns of the same length
yield different degrees of residual risk for different subjects. For instance, at the 96 hour mark the
discovery probability estimate across subjects ranges over four orders of magnitude (e.g., libxml2
vs. json). The second observation that we can make is that for the same subject, the variance of the
estimate across fuzzing campaigns is rather small, indicating a certain degree of representativeness.
The third observation is a general deceleration where each discovery probability seems to almost
approach a horizontal asymptote: As the campaign continues it takes more and more test inputs
12If the environment variable AFL_EXIT_WHEN_DONE is set, AFL automatically aborts the current fuzzing campaign at
the end of a cycle in which no new path was discovered, starting from the 100th cycle.
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Table 4. Average of the path coverage estimates Gˆ(n) = S(n)/Sˆ , the number of discovered paths S(n), the bias
and precision of Sˆ over time, and the discovery probability estimate Uˆ (n) within the first 96 hours (4 days).
The colored curves in the second and last row represent one fuzzing campaign each.
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Table 5. Average of the path coverage estimates Gˆ(n) = S(n)/Sˆ , the number of discovered paths S(n), the bias
and precision of Sˆ over time, and the discovery probability estimate Uˆ (n) within the first 96 hours (4 days).
The colored curves in the second and last row represent one fuzzing campaign each.
ffmpeg libjpeg−turbo libxml2
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Av
g.
 P
a
th
 C
ov
e
ra
ge
 
G^
(n)
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
#P
a
th
s 
D
is
co
ve
re
d 
S(
n)
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96
−0.4
−0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
Bi
as
 o
f S^
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Im
pr
ec
isi
on
 o
f S^
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96
10−0
10−2
10−4
10−6
10−8
10−10
Time (in hours)
D
is
co
ve
ry
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
 U^
28
to achieve the same decrease in discovery probability (and hence the same decrease of residual
risk). Our fourth observation is that fuzzing campaigns with a relatively high discovery probability
(libxml2, openssl) also achieve a relatively low path coverage estimate (1st row) with a relatively
high estimator bias (3rd row). This provides opportunities to devise suitable adaptive bias correction
strategies based on the discovery probability.
RQ.3 Bias of Sˆ . For four of six subjects, the bias reduces to within ±10% of the true species richness
S within the first 12 hours. For the other two (libxml2 and openssl), it takes 48 hours. In some cases
the mean bias is systematic and negative, in other cases it is systematic and positive. The magnitude
of the positive bias can be substantial in the first few hours (>5.0 for ffmpeg). Notice, a substantial
over-estimation of species richness S results in a (conservative) under-estimation of the path coverage
G(n). However, in all cases the mean bias tends to zero (0) as the number of generated test inputs
increases over time. There are several sources of bias in estimating S .
Campaign Ramp-up. In the beginning of a fuzzing campaign, there is often substantial bias,
both positive and negative. At one minute, the total number of paths S for json, openssl, and libjpeg-
turbo is substantially over-estimated with a positive mean bias of 6.2, 1.6, and 1.4, respectively. At
one minute, the total number of paths S for ffmpeg, libxml2, and wireshark are under-estimated
with a considerable negative mean bias of -0.9, -0.7, and -0.2, respectively. Firstly, there is simply
not sufficient data to extrapolate well [19], i.e. there is no discernible asymptote that can be used
for a good estimate of S . Secondly, when Pythia goes through the circular queue (i.e., the seed
corpus) for the first time, the quality of the seeds varies. Meaning, the number of paths discovered
by fuzzing one seed does generally not represent the number of paths discovered by fuzzing another
seed. So, the estimate Sˆ is biased. Seed quality has less impact as more queue cycles are completed.
Thirdly, Pythia is a coverage-based fuzzer and thus adaptively biased. Test inputs that increase
coverage are added to the seed corpus. So, the fuzzer’s capability to discover paths effectively
improves over time [9]. Hence, early estimates of S , particularly until the 12 hour mark, are often
substantially biased. Note that an over-estimate of S yields an under-estimate of path coverage G.
Adaptive bias. Pythia (AFL) is a coverage-based fuzzer which means that the relative species
abundance changes during the fuzzing campaign (see Section 9.5). New seeds may be added to the
corpus that enable the discovery of path that might otherwise be difficult to discover [9]. Sudden
increases in the number of discovered paths can cause the current asymptote Sˆ to systematically
under-estimate S . This happens for instance when an interesting test input was generated that
contains the correct value for a “magic number” [99]. As we can see for libjpeg-turbo and libxml2
in the second row of Table 5, the magnitude of the increase can be quite substantial. The estimator
Sˆ is negatively biased because of a “false” asymptote for the first 18 hours (libjpeg-turbo, 3rd row).
This results in sudden drops in path coverage Gˆ when many new paths are discovered in short
intervals (libjpeg-turbo, 1st row).
Lower bound. The Chao1-estimator Sˆ of species richness is designed (and proved) to provide
a practical lower bound rather than an imprecise point estimate [15]. In fact, Chao1 is an unbi-
ased point estimator if rare species (undetected and singleton species) have approximately equal
abundance [19]. If very rare species are unevenly distributed, the available data simply does not
contain sufficient information. So the estimator Sˆ might be negatively biased (i.e., systematically
under-estimate the true number of species S). We can see this negative bias clearly for libxml2 and
openssl (3rd row in tables 4 and 5). For openssl, this results in a path coverage that remains appar-
ently constant between 85% and 95% (1st row) despite more paths being discovered (2nd row). The
estimate for openssl is negatively biased because there is no discernible horizontal asymptote that
could function as a less biased estimate Sˆ (2nd row). For libxml2, there is no discernible asymptote,
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either. We continued the libxml2 experiments past the 96-hour for a total of 800 hours (i.e., 33 days)
to see whether the low path coverage value is warranted. Indeed, the number of paths discovered
increased from an average 7.6k to an average 10.8k paths. It is interesting to note that the discovery
probability (bottom row) for libxml2 and openssl is up to four order of magnitutes higher than for
the other four subjects. Hence, we attribute the negative bias for these two subjects to the large
number of rare species that are unequally distributed. We expect the negative mean bias in Sˆ to be
smaller if the improved estimator iChao1 [31] is used.
However, independent of the source, the bias always tends to zero (0) as the number of generated
test inputs n increases. In the case of libjpeg-turbo, the mean bias seems to remain negative from
18 hours onwards (row 3); the mean bias actually goes to about zero after about 65 hours due
to a sudden increase from 2k to 2.5k discovered paths for one fuzzing campaign (yellow line for
libjpeg-turbo in 2nd row). The tendency of the mean bias towards zero as the number of generated
test inputs n increases is empirical evidence of the statistical consistency of the estimator Sˆ despite
the adaptive sampling bias of Pythia and despite Chao1 being a biased estimator. We expect the
positive and negative bias in Sˆ to be smaller if a coverage-based estimator, such as ACE [24] is used.
RQ.4 Precision of Sˆ . For all subjects, the imprecision reduces to at most 10% of S within the first 12
hours and to at most 1% of S within the first 100 hours. The imprecision is high particularly in the
beginning while the number of discovered paths increases significantly within a relatively small time
interval. However, in all cases the imprecision tends to zero (0) as the number of generated test inputs
increases over time. The precision of an estimator quantifies the variance of the provided estimates.
A high precision means that the estimates are very similar across different fuzzing campaigns. The
fourth row in tables 4 and 5 shows the imprecision of the estimators for our subjects. When the
estimator’s imprecision is high, its precision is low, and vice versa.
As we can see for all subjects the imprecision is high when the slope of the number of paths
discovered over time is steep (2nd row). This is the case in the first few hours of the fuzzing
campaign when most paths are discovered (e.g., ffmpeg), and later when there are sudden increases
(e.g., libjpeg-turbo). The single outlier run for libjpeg-turbo (2nd row, yellow line) illustrates an
important challenge when computing species coverage for coverage-based greybox fuzzers, such
as Pythia. The Chao1-estimator essentially estimates the y-intercept of the horizontal asymptote
of the curve describing the number of paths discovered over time (2nd row). The number of paths
discovered might seem to approach a clear (but “false”) asymptote when actually there is a sudden
increase several hours later. As we can see, path coverage is bias-corrected once the sudden increase
has happened (1st to 4th row in libjpeg-turbo between 12 and 18 hours). Until then, the security
researcher might incorrectly presume that the fuzzing campaign has exceeded a path coverage
threshold that is required to mark the campaign as completed. However, we can also see in the
second row that some programs are more prone to such sudden increases than others, and those
are mostly constrained within the first few hours.
In all cases the imprecision tends towards zero (0) as the number of generated test inputs n
increases. After 100 hours the imprecision is generally less than 0.01, indicating small variance and
high precision. Again, in the case of libjpeg-turbo, the imprecision remaining just below 0.1 from
18 hours onwards (row 3) can be explained with the outlier campaign that converges only after
65 hours. The tendency of the imprecision towards zero as the number of generated test inputs n
increases is empirical evidence of the representativeness of the estimation computed for one fuzzing
campaign for other fuzzing campaigns of the same length.
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6.4 Extrapolator Evaluation
Let t be the time that the fuzzer has spent generatingn test inputs within the fuzzing campaign. Since
the time to generate a test input is fairly constant across all our fuzzing campaigns, we estimate the
numberm∗ of test inputs generated in the interval from t to t+t∗ where t∗ ∈ {30min, 1hr , 2hrs, 4hrs}
asm∗ = nt∗/t . At time t , we compute the mean bias for the estimate Sˆ(n +m∗) of the number of
discovered paths S(n +m∗) ifm∗ more test inputs were generated as the average bias over N = 10
runs. At time t , we compute the imprecision of Sˆ(n +m∗) as the standard deviation of the bias:
mean bias =
N∑
i=1
Sˆi (n +m∗) − Si (n +m∗)
NSi (n +m∗) (21)
imprecision =
√√√√ N∑
i=1
(
Sˆi (n +m∗) − Si (n +m∗)
Si (n +m∗) −
N∑
j=1
Sˆ j (n +m∗) − S j (n +m∗)
NS j (n +m∗)
)2
N − 1 (22)
where S(n +m∗) is empirically determined at time t + t∗ and thus provides the true value of the
estimation target.
RQ.5 Bias Sˆ(n +m∗). The number of paths discovered and thus path coverage can be effectively
extrapolated with low bias. The magnitude of the bias increases with the extrapolation interval and
decreases as more test inputs n are generated. Table 6 shows the mean bias within the first 48 hours
(top) and the first 12 hours (bottom) of the fuzzing campaign. We chose these two intervals because
of the difference in the magnitude of the bias in the first few hours. In fact, the bottom four rows
feature a large range of the bias between -20% and 50% of the true, empirical S(n +m∗) while the
top four rows feature a much smaller range between -8% and 8% of S(n +m∗).
As we can see in Table 6, Sˆ(n +m∗) might substantially over-estimate the number of paths
discovered in the first few hours. We explain this strong positive bias of Sˆ(n +m∗) with the strong
positive bias of the estimate Sˆ of the total number of paths which forms an important component in
the extrapolation methodology proposed by Shen et al. [90] (see Table 4-3rd row). After the initial
over-estimation, Sˆ(n +m∗) is generally slightly (but systematically) under-estimated. Effectively,
the estimator begins to provide a conservative estimate of the increase in path coverage. We explain
this small negative bias with Pythia being a coverage-based greybox fuzzer. Indeed, we expect a
blackbox fuzzer (without adaptive sampling bias) to detect less paths per unit time. Another source
of negative bias is a sudden increase in the number of paths discovered that would be difficult to
anticipate (e.g., for libjpeg-turbo compare Table 6-top and Table 5-2nd row). We also notice that the
magnitude of the bias increases with the extrapolation interval. The reason is fairly obvious: The
quality of the extrapolation will be worse the further we want to look into the future. However,
the rule of thumb in ecology [33] to limit the extrapolation to within twice the current sampling
effort does not find very strong empirical support for our six subjects in the domain of automated
software testing and analysis.
For all six subjects and all four extrapolation intervals, the bias remains within ±2% of the
empirical value S(n +m∗) from 18 hours onwards. The tendency of the bias towards zero (0) as the
number n of generated test inputs increases might be explained with an expected deceleration of
the number of paths S(n) discovered over time approaching an asymptotic total number of paths S
(see 2nd row in tables Table 4 and Table 5).
RQ.6 Precision Sˆ(n +m∗). The number of paths discovered and thus path coverage can be effectively
extrapolated with high precision. The magnitude of the imprecision increases with the extrapolation
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Table 6. Bias and imprecision for 6 subjects at 4 extrapolation intervals for ≤ 48hrs (top) and ≤ 12hrs (bottom).
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interval and decreases as more test inputs n are generated. The imprecision does not seem to be
affected as substantially as the bias by the initial surge of path discoveries (see ffmpeg and openssl,
bottom rows). However, the magnitude of the imprecision generally mirrors that of the bias,
suggesting that bias and imprecision have the same sources. Like the bias, the imprecision tends
towards zero (0) as the number n of generated test inputs increases.
6.5 Result Summary
The objectives of this empirical evaluation were (1) to test my main hypothesis within the STADS
framework, (2) to evaluate several methodologies from ecology within the STADS framework, and
(3) to investigate the impact of the adaptive sampling bias.
6.5.1 Main Hypothesis. I hypothesize that within the STADS framework rare, discovered species
contain almost all information about the detectable species that remain undiscovered. Rare species
are those to which only a small number of generated test inputs belong. In our experiments, all
methodologies used to extrapolate from the discovered to undiscovered species (i.e., from tested
to untested program behaviors) are based on the number of singletons or doubleton species. The
experimental results show good estimator performance for these methodologies and thus support
my main hypothesis.
6.5.2 Estimator Evaluation. We find that discovery probability provides a useful indicator of
the residual risk that a discoverable vulnerability exists but remains undiscovered in the ongoing
fuzzing campaign. The discovery probability estimate measured for one fuzzing campaign is fairly
representative for other fuzzing campaigns of similar length.13 While the estimates for 10 runs
range over three orders of magnitude across subjects, they all range within the same order of
magnitude for the same subject. The similarity between estimates of different runs for the same
subject (i.e., the precision) increases as the number n of generated inputs increases.
We find that path coverage provides a useful indicator of the progress of a fuzzing campaign
towards completion that can be used to decide effectively whether to abort or continue a fuzzing
campaign. The path coverage estimate can be positively and negatively biased. The bias is most
substantial during campaign ramp-up, within the first 12 hours, when many paths are discovered.
Another source of substantial bias is the existence of many rare species (see discussion in Section 9.1),
and the sudden discovery of many paths at once (see discussion in Section 9.5). However, for all
subjects the magnitude of the bias reduces as the number n of generated test inputs increases.
Similarly, the precision is low in the first few hours while the number of discovered paths increases
significantly within a relatively small time interval. However, in all cases precision increases as n
increases.
We find that path coverage can be extrapolated with low bias and high precision. Like the path
coverage estimate, the extrapolation can be positively and negatively biased. Sudden surges in the
number of discovered paths are not anticipated resulting in negative bias and some imprecision. A
substantial over-estimation of the total number of paths in the first few hours might result in a
substantial positive bias and some imprecision. The magnitude of bias and imprecision increases
with the extrapolation interval and decreases as more test inputs n are generated. We do not find
very strong evidence that the rule of thumb in ecology [33] to keep the extrapolation within twice
the sampling effort applies to automated software testing and analysis. Other sources of bias and
imprecision seem to have a stronger impact.
13More specifically, discovery probability is fairly representative for other fuzzing campaigns where the same program is
fuzzed for the same time using the same fuzzer and seed corpus (if any).
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6.5.3 Impact of Adaptive Sampling Bias. An underlying assumption of most methodologies in
the STADS framework is that the probability pi to generate a test input that belongs to species Di
does not change substantially during the fuzzing campaign. However, it does for feedback-directed
fuzzers, such as Pythia (which is based on AFL). A feedback-directed fuzzer continuously adapts the
strategy to generate new test input based on feedback for previous test inputs. For instance, Pythia
augments the existing seed corpus with generated test inputs that increased branch coverage. New
test inputs are generated by random mutations of the seed inputs that are continuously selected
from a circular queue that represents the (extended) seed corpus. As the seed corpus grows, the
relative species abundance {pi }Si=1 changes as well. This is called an adaptive sampling bias, because
the sampling strategy changes adaptively during the sampling itself.
We find that in the beginning of a fuzzing campaign the adaptive sampling bias has a large impact
on estimator performance. In the first few hours, the total number of species Sˆ is often substantially
under-estimated which is explained by the improving capability of Pythia to discover new species
as new seeds are added to the seed corpus. In the beginning, a large number of new seeds are added
as new species are discovered.
We find that as more test inputs are generated the impact reduces. For Pythia, the species
discovery curve is strictly correlated with the adaptive sampling bias. For every new species that is
discovered, a seed is added to the seed corpus. Hence, as species discovery decelerates over time,
the adaptive bias reduces just as well. For some subjects, the number of discovered species seems to
approach a false asymptote, leading to a negatively biased estimate of species richness Sˆ (and thus a
positively biased estimate of species coverage Gˆ) when suddenly many more species are discovered,
e.g., because a magic number discovered [99]. This is also explained by the adaptive sampling bias,
and its impact reduces over time. A more general discussion on the impact of adaptive sampling
bias follows in Section 9.5.
7 BERNOULLI PRODUCT MODEL: ONE INPUT, MULTIPLE SPECIES
Fig. 6. Quadrats positioned at random locations
in the assemblage. Present species are recorded
for each quadrat. Image credit: NPS Sonoran
Desert Network (Licence: CC-BY-2.0).
So far, we have discussed the multinomial model14
in the STADS framework, where each input belongs
to exactly one species, e.g., an input can exercise only
exactly one path. However, there are many other con-
crete testing objectives where each input belongs to
one or more species. For instance, a single input can ex-
ercise multiple coverage-goals, such as program state-
ments, branches, or methods; a single input can kill
multiple mutants [64], witness multiple information
flows [71], violate multiple assertions, expose mul-
tiple bugs, and traverse multiple program states. In
ecology, it is a sampling unit that can contain multiple
species. A sampling unit is usually a physical trap, net,
quadrat, or plot. These sampling units are distributed
in the assemblage and studied exhaustively—in lieu
of the assemblage itself. When only the presence (or
absence) of species can be determined in a sampling
unit, ecologist call the data as incidence data and utilize the Bernoulli product model [20]. In the
Bernoulli product model, within STADS a generated test input is considered as sampling unit.
14The multinomial model is introduced in Section 3.5. Specific estimators and extrapolators for the multinomial model are
discussed in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Several of those are evaluated in Section 6.
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In the following, we extend our STADS statistical framework to account for testing objectives
that yield multiple species identified for a single input. Let n be the number of inputs that have
been generated throughout the current fuzzing campaign, S(n) be the number of species that have
been discovered, and S be the total number of species. Define {Wi j | i = 1, 2, . . . , S ∧ j = 1, 2, . . . ,n}
as the incidence matrix whereWi j = 1 if the jth generated test input belongs to species Di , and
Wi j = 0 otherwise. Let Yi be the number of generated test inputs that belong to species Di for
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ S , then Yi = ∑nj=1Wi j . For species that exist but remain undiscovered in the current
fuzzing campaign, we have Y = 0. Define the incidence frequency count Qk for k : 0 ≤ k ≤ n, as the
number of species to which exactly k test inputs belong that have been generated throughout the
current fuzzing campaign. More formally, Qk =
∑S
i=1 I (Yi = k). Hence, n ≤
∑n
k=1 kQk =
∑S
i=1 Yi
and S(n) = ∑nk=1Qk . The incidence frequency count Qk is analogous to the abundance frequency
count fk for the multinomial model. The unobservable zero frequency countQ0 denotes the number
of species that remain undiscovered in the current fuzzing campaign. We call Q1 the number of
singleton species and Q2 the number of doubleton species.
The probability that the fuzzer generates a test input that belongs to species Di is pi for i :
1 ≤ i ≤ S . Note that ∑Si=1 pi ≥ 1. We assume that eachWi j is a Bernoulli random variable with
probability pi thatWi j = 1 (and analogously with probability 1 − pi thatWi j = 0). Thus, the
probability distribution for the incidence matrix is
P(Wi j = wi j ; i = 1, 2, . . . , S ; j = 1, 2, . . . ,n) =
n∏
j=1
S∏
i=1
p
wi j
i (1 − pi )1−wi j (23)
=
S∏
i=1
p
yi
i (1 − pi )n−yi where yi =
n∑
j=1
wi j (24)
From Equation 24, we can see that the row sums (Y1,Y2, . . . ,YS ) are sufficient statistics. This
renders the incidence frequency counts Qk suitable components for the estimators of species
richness. The number of generated test inputs Yi that belong to species Di follows a binomial
distribution
P(Yi = yi ) =
(
n
yi
)
p
yi
i (1 − pi )n−yi where i = 1, 2, . . . , S (25)
Chao and Colwell [20] provide more details about the Bernoulli product model and its utility in
the ecologic context.
7.1 Estimation in the Bernoulli Product Model
Estimating S . In the Bernoulli product model of the STADS framework, the estimation of species
richness S (i.e., the asymptotic total number of species) can be done using the Chao2 and iChao2-
estimators, which were derived by Chao [16] and Chui et al. [31].
SˆChao2 ≈
{
S(n) +Q21/(2Q2) if Q2 > 0
S(n) +Q1(Q1 − 1)/2 if Q2 = 0
(26)
SˆiChao2 ≈ SˆChao2 + Q34Q4 ×max
(
Q1 − Q2Q32Q4 , 0
)
(27)
Chao [16] showed that the Chao2 estimator SˆChao2 provides a nonparametric lower bound on the
total number of species S in an assemblage. Very recently, Chao and colleagues showed that the
Chao2 estimator is an unbiased point estimator as long as very rare species (specifically, undetected
and singleton species) have approximately equal detection probability [19].
35
Alternative estimators of species richness S in the Bernoulli product model include Jacknife
estimators [13, 81, 95] and coverage-based estimators, such as ICE [65] and ICE-1 [51], that a
particularly suitable when species diversity is high (i.e., when species evenness J is low).
Estimating U . For inputs that can belong to one or more species, the estimate Uˆ (n) of the
discovery probability requires information not only about singleton and doubleton species but
also about all discovered species [20]. In the Bernoulli product model of the STADS framework, the
discovery probability is estimated as
Uˆ (n) = Q1
V
[
nQˆ0
nQˆ0 +Q1
]
(28)
≈ Q1
V
(29)
where in the current fuzzing campaignV =
∑n
k=1 kQk =
∑S
i=1
∑n
j=1Wi j denotes the sum of all entries
in the incidence matrixWi j , n is the number of test inputs generated, the number of undetected
species can be estimated as Qˆ0 = Sˆ − S(n), and Q1 and Q2 are the incidence frequency counts of
singletons and doubletons, respectively. Note that the sum of all entries V in the incidence matrix
does not require storing the complete incidence matrixWi j . Instead, V can be aggregated during
the fuzzing campaign. Also notice the similarity of the approximation to the Good-Turing estimator
for the multinomial model [48].
7.2 Extrapolation in the Bernoulli Product Model
Extrapolating S(n). In the Bernoulli product model of the STADS framework, to estimate the
expected number of discovered species Sˆ(n +m∗) when n test inputs have already been generated
and ifm∗ more test inputs were to be generated, we have
Sˆ(n +m∗) = S(n) + Qˆ0
[
1 −
(
1 − Q1
nQˆ0 +Q1
)m∗ ]
(30)
where for the current fuzzing campaign n is the number of generated test inputs, S(n) is the number
of discovered species, Qˆ0 = Sˆ − S(n) is the expected number of undiscovered species, and Q1 is the
number of singletons.
ExtrapolatingU (n). In the Bernoulli product model of the STADS framework, the estimate of
the expected discovery probability Uˆ (n +m∗) ifm∗ more test inputs were generated is computed as
Uˆ (n +m∗) = Q1
V
[
nQˆ0
nQˆ0 +Q1
]m∗+1
(31)
where for the current fuzzing campaign V =
∑n
k=1 kQk =
∑S
i=1
∑n
j=1Wi j denotes the sum of all
entries in the incidence matrixWi j , n is the number of generated test inputs, S(n) is the number of
discovered species, Qˆ0 = Sˆ − S(n) is the expected number of undiscovered species, and Q1 is the
number of singletons.
EstimatingmG∗ when G∗ = S(n +mG∗ )/Sˆ is given. To reach a fraction G∗ of estimated total
number of species Sˆ where Gˆ(n) < G∗ ≤ 1, in the Bernoulli product model of the STADS framework
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the required numbermG∗ of further test inputs is estimated as [21]
mG∗ ≈
log
[
1 − n(n − 1)
2Q2
Q21
(G∗Sˆ − S(n))
]
log
[
1 − 2Q2(n − 1)Q1 + 2Q2
] (32)
where in the current fuzzing campaignn is the number of generated test inputs, S(n) is the number of
discovered species, and Q1 and Q2 are the incidence frequency counts for singleton and doubleton
species, respectively. The expected fuzzing time can be computed by multiplying the expected
number of test inputs with the average time the fuzzer takes to generate a test input.
8 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, in the domain of software testing and analysis, there exists no previous
work on estimating the asymptotic total number of species, or on extrapolating the number of species
discovered over time for any definition of species. In fact, Whalen [97] says about the future of
verification and validation that one of the biggest problems today is that there is no sound basis to
extrapolate from tested to untested cases. We strongly believe that the STADS framework provides a
statistically well-grounded basis to extrapolate from tested to untested program behaviors.
8.1 Residual Risk Assessment
Finding no vulnerabilities in a (long-running) fuzzing campaign does not mean that none exists. In
the STADS framework, the discovery probability U (n) measures the probability to discover a new
species with the n + 1th generated test input where n is the number of test inputs that have been
generated throughout the fuzzing campaign. If the dynamic analysis is able to identify vulnerabilities,
then an accurate estimate of the discovery probability provides a statistical guarantee that no
detectable vulnerability exists if none has been discovered. In other words, security researchers
can use the STADS statistical framework for residual risk assessment.
There exist several systematic approaches to quantify the reliability of a program. However, Filieri
et al. [40] recently noted that most existing approaches work on the design- and architectural
level rather than on the program itself. The authors present a program-level reliability estimation
technique that uses probabilistic symbolic execution [44] to compute the probability of satisfying
any of the path conditions corresponding to non-error-exposing paths. In other words, the ap-
proach computes the proportion of inputs which exercise paths that do not expose an error. Since
probabilistic symbolic execution leverages model counting to determine the proportion of inputs
exercising a path, the approach works only for very small input spaces. In contrast, we propose a
lightweight statistical technique to estimate the confidence that a fuzzing campaign inspires in the
correctness of a program, and that scales to programs of arbitrary size.
There exist several statistical approaches to quantify the reliability of a program. For instance, the
problem of estimating the probability P(n) to discover an error with the n + 1th test input, given
that no errors have been found after generating n test inputs can be cast as a variant of the sunrise
problem15 which is classically solved with Laplace’s rule of succession [63]: P(n) = 1/(n+2). Suppose,
s of n generated inputs expose an error, then the probability to generate another error-exposing
input follows a beta-distribution Beta(s + 1,n − s + 1) the postorior of which has the expected value
(s + 1)/(n + 2).
15Given that we have seen the sun rise for n consecutive days, what is the probability that the sun will rise tomorrow?
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Miller et al. [76] recognized the utility of the beta-distribution to quantify the probability of
failure in the absence of failures and furthermore discuss the case where the test distribution does
not overlap with the operational distribution (i.e., the fuzzer might not generate “typical” inputs,
but we are interested in the program’s reliability for typical inputs). Littlewood andWright [66] also
utilize the beta-distribution but discuss how to update the previous estimate of the probability of
failure after a bug was found and fixed. In contrast to these existing works, the STADS framework
leverages information on the problem structure by identifying the species for an input. Hence,
we can provide more accurate estimates of the residual risk that a detectable vulnerability has
remained undetected and of the confidence that a fuzzing campaign inspires in the correctness of
the program. Moreover, the STADS framework is more general and also provides methodologies to
estimate the total number of species and to extrapolate the number of species discovered at some
future point in time.
It is interesting to note that only 25 years ago, the execution of one hundred million (n = 108)
test inputs was utterly unthinkable [56]. Hamlet and Voas conjecture that “[..] direct reliability
assessment by random testing of software is impractical. The levels we would like to achieve, on
the order of 106–108 executions without failure, cannot be established in a reasonable time. Some
limitations of reliability testing can be overcome, but the “ultrareliable” region above 108 failure-free
executions is likely to remain forever untestable” [56]. Today, Google’s continuous fuzzing platform
OSS-Fuzz generates 10 trillion (1010) test inputs per day [116].
When test inputs are generated manually, a general suggestion is to increase the code coverage.
The most popular measures are code coverage metrics, such as statement, branch, or MC/DC
coverage, and fault coverage metrics, such as relative mutation adequacy [64]. The hope is that the
fault revelation of a set of test inputs increases as its coverage increases. In other words, maximal
coverage should inspire maximal confidence. However, many recent empirical studies found that
such coverage metrics are in fact poor indicators of test suite effectiveness in the context of automated
software test generation [28, 43, 62]. The empirical results may be explained by early theoretical
investigations of testing effectiveness [38, 55, 127]. Böhme and Paul [7] similar to Hamlet and
Taylor [55] argue that a set of successful test inputs (i.e., no input exposes an error) that achieves
100% branch coverage, 100% MC/DC coverage, and even 100% relative mutation adequacy does not
inspire any degree of confidence in the correctness of the tested program. Indeed, vulnerabilities
may still exist. In contrast, STADS provides a statistically well-grounded framework to assess the
residual risk that a detectable vulnerability exists even if none has been found.
8.2 Partition Testing
In partition testing, the program’s input domain is partitioned into overlapping or non-overlapping
subdomains [127]. The task of a tester is to select one or more elements from each subdomain. In
the STADS framework, we would say that each and only input in the same subdomain belongs to
the same species. However, unlike in the STADS framework each input subdomain in partition
testing is associated with a probability θi that an input in this subdomain reveals an error [38].
Partition testing is a probabilistic model of software testing which allows to investigate the tester’s
ability to detect faults.
Analyzing the effectiveness of random testing, Duran an Ntfos [38] used the partition testing
model to show that the expected number of errors д(n) discovered after n test inputs have been
sampled uniformly at random, for the case of non-overlapping subdomains, is given as
д(n) = S −
S∑
i=1
(1 − piθi )n
38
where S is the total number of subdomains, and pi is the probability that the randomly sampled
input lies in subdomain Di . Duran and Ntfos observed experimentally that a tester who samples
one or more inputs from each subdomain performs only slightly better than simple random testing.
Varying several parameters, the Hamlet and Taylor [55] repeated the experiments of Duran and
Ntafos and confirm: The number of errors found by random and partition testing is very similar. In
fact, the authors conclude that “partition testing does not inspire confidence”. Weyuker and Jeng
[127] found that the effectiveness of partition testing varies depending on the fault rate θi for each
subdomain. Subsequently, several authors discussed conditions under which partition testing is
generally more effective than random testing (e.g., [29, 52]). Empirical investigations [28, 43, 62] of
the effectiveness of partition testing have since confirmed Hamlet and Taylor’s conclusion [55].
In our previous work [7] we leverage the partition testing model to conduct the first probabilistic
analysis of the efficiency of automated software testing. We identify bounds on the time the
most effective systematic testing technique can take per test input to remain more efficient than
random testing. We develop a hypothetical hybrid testing technique that is more efficient than both,
random and systematic testing. We also suggest a primitive curve fitting method to extrapolate the
partitions discovered over time. However, in the present article we introduce more sophisticated
sampling-theoretic extrapolation methodologies.
While the partition testing model allows probabilistic analyses, the STADS framework allows
statistical analyses, including estimation and extrapolation. Probabilistic and statistical analysis are
inverse to each other. In a probabilistic analysis we consider some underlying random process where
the randomness is modelled by random variables, and we resolve what happens. In a statistical
analysis we observe something that has happened, and try to resolve what underlying process
would explain those observations. In contrast to existing work, we present practical estimation and
extrapolation methodologies. The STADS framework is the first work in automated software testing
that allows to extrapolate from tested to untested program behavior with quantifiable accuracy.
9 CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
9.1 Programs as Megadiverse Assemblages
The STADS framework exhibits some peculiar features that make the application of existing ecologic
methodologies more challenging: specifically, one has to deal with extremely large populations
containing a huge number of species (e.g., millions of program branches or exponentially more
distinct paths). Specifically, compared to common assemblages in ecology, we expect species
richness S to be very high and species evenness J to be very low in the STADS model. In other
words, there are a huge number of very rare species and only a few extremely abundant species.
9.1.1 Megadiversity. In ecology, we call an assemblage with high richness and low evenness as
megadiverse assemblage. For instance, arthropods (i.e., bugs, millipedes, spiders, etc.) in a tropical
forest would be considered a megadiverse assemblage. [4]. There are an estimated 6.1 million
tropical arthropod species, most of which are rare [53, 54]. Such assemblages are subject to several
statistical challenges during estimation and extrapolation, particularly due to the relatively small
sample size [34, 69]. However, compared to species inventories common in ecology, the sample size
n in the STADS framework can be very large, which should render our data precious for ecologic
biostatisticians. For instance, it took 102 ecology researchers 66 person-years to sample 129,494
arthropods representing 6144 species from 0.48 ha of tropical rain forest [4]. In stark contrast, a
fuzzer can take a million samples in only a few minutes.
9.1.2 Scarcity. The main objective of fuzzing is to discover vulnerabilities in a program. Vul-
nerabilities are arguably very rare species in the STADS framework. Similarly, a primary objective
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of many ecological surveys is to identify species that are so rare that they are close to extinction.
Once identified, the necessary conservation policies are proposed and implemented to counter the
diminishing biodiversity.
For the STADS framework, we should identify, develop and employ estimators that are better
suitable if many rare species are present. Colwell et al. [33] suggest to employ coverage-based
estimators of species richness [24, 27, 51, 65] if one expects many rare species. Mao and Collwell [69]
propose a mixture model to compute, with confidence intervals, a lower bound on species richness
when there are many rare species. In amixture model, species abundance or occurrence distributions
are modelled as a weighted mixture of statistical distributions. Ohannessian [78] observes that the
Good-Turing estimator of discovery probability performs well even in the presence of many rare
species. Chao et al. [22] generalize the Good-Turing estimator to develop the Good-Turing sample
coverage theory. In future, coverage-based and mixture-model-based as well as other rare event
estimators [10, 78] and their performance within the STADS framework can be studied. Other
suitable estimators for megadiverse assemblages with many rare species can be developed that
would benefit tremendously both fields of research.
9.1.3 Endemism. Another challenge in fuzzing is the random generation of “magic numbers”,
such as file identifiers [99]. Only if the magic number is correct will the generated test input exercise
interesting program behaviors. Only if the magic number is correct will many new species be
discovered. A similar challenge exists in ecology. Endemism is the ecological state of a species being
unique to a defined geographic location. For instance, the rain forest of Madagascar hosts a large
number of (endemic) species that can only be found in Madagascar [50]. A global survey of the
biodiversity in rain forests would miss many species if the “magic island” of Madagascar remains
uninvestigated. A survey of the biodiversity in the Sahara desert would miss many species if oases
remain uninvestigated [39]. Hence, it is sensible only to provide an improved lower bound of the
total number of species S [15, 16].
9.1.4 Opportunities. Strategies could be established that allow to chose the best estimator at
any time during the fuzzing campaign based on estimates of species evenness J and discovery
probability U (e.g., [11]). Several estimators of the same quantity may be used to derive a “best
estimate” [4]. In the STADS framework, the program’s source code and program binary provide an
additional source of information that can be used to improve estimator performance. In future, the
dependence of estimator bias and precision on the sample completeness C can be investigated to
develop better bias-correction mechanisms.
9.2 Species Identification and Oracle Problem
In the STADS framework, the species for an input t is identified using a combination of dynamic
analyzers which record during execution of t the observed program properties of interest. For
instance, to detect bugs in C programs, the compiler can be asked to inject so-called sanitizers
[89, 92], assertions that crash the program when a bug is detected. There are different sanitizers
[101, 106], e.g.,
• to detect memory related errors, such as overflows and use-after-free (AddressSanitizer),
• to detect race conditions and deadlocks (ThreadSanitizer),
• to detect undefined behaviors (UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer),
• to detect memory leaks (LeakSanitizer), or
• to check control-flow integrity (CFISanitizer).
Whether a bug constitutes an exploitable vulnerability can be determined with excellent precision
and good recall using another dynamic analysis, e.g., the CERT Triage Tools [100].
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9.2.1 Misidentification and Guarantees. The correct identification of the species for an input
is an important challenge in both disciplines. For instance, in ecology Austen et al. [1] observed
that even taxonomic experts were correct in only 60% of cases when asked whether two images
showed the same or different species of bumblebees. Similarly, in the STADS framework a dynamic
analysis may misidentify the species for an input. For instance, misidentification in software testing
may lead to input incorrectly classified as not exposing a vulnerability (when it actually does).
Hence, the statistical guarantees provided by the STADS model holdmodulo the dynamic analyzer’s
capability to identify the correct species for an input. This motivates further research on advanced
dynamic analysis techniques that are more effective at vulnerability detection.
It is interesting to note that misidentification is also an important challenge for automated
verification. The formal guarantees provided by the verifier are valid only modulo the provided
specification which may be incomplete. For instance, the specification may allow to check whether
a race conditions exists (a classic model checking problem)—but not whether a buffer overflow
exists (the number-one root cause of arbitrary code execution attacks).
9.2.2 Morphospecies and Oracle Problem. In ecology, some individuals cannot be assigned to
named species. A morphospecies is different from previously discovered species (in its morphology)
but not to a sufficient degree that it could be assigned its own species. A similar challenge is known
in the software testing domain as oracle problem. Weyuker [126] conjectures that, in general, there
exists no mechanism that can accurately decide whether or not the program behavior for an input
is correct—whether an observed behavior is a bug or a feature of the program. Barr et al. [3] provide
an excellent survey of recent advances in tackling the oracle problem.
9.3 Integrating Other Models Into STADS
The STADS framework provides opportunities to explore other topics, models, and related method-
ologies in ecology. For instance, a typical problem in ecology is the extrapolation of the number of
species in an enlarged area of sizeA+a∗, given only a sample of a smaller area of sizeA [26]. This is
modelled as continuous Poisson model [32]. In the Poisson model, the reference sample is not defined
by sample size n but by the area A that is sampled. The ith species occurs at a species-specific mean
rate Aλi , so that the probability distribution is
P(X1 = x1, . . . ,XS = xs ) =
S∏
i=1
(Aλi )xi exp(−Aλi )
xi !
(33)
In fuzzing, we often restrict the size of the generated test inputs because larger inputs might take
longer to execute, and species appear to be distributed more densely in the space of small inputs.
Within the STADS framework, we can leverage the Poisson model to estimate the total number
of species for large inputs, given a fuzzing campaign that restricted the fuzzing to only smaller
inputs. For instance, in Google’s continuous fuzzing platform OSS-Fuzz [116], the main fuzzer
LibFuzzer [109] is often configured with a maximum test input size. The Poisson model would
allow to extrapolate the confidence such “restricted” fuzzing campaigns inspire in the absence of
vulnerabilities from the small generated test inputs to larger “normal-sized” inputs.
In future, mixture models [69] can be developed that synthesize better estimates from those
provided by the multinomial and the Poisson model. In order to integrate the Poisson and Bernoulli
product models successfully into the STADS framework, an empirical evaluation of estimator
performance is left for future work.
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9.4 Non-Adaptive Sampling Bias
The STADS framework fully accounts for arbitrary fuzzer heuristics, including the sampling from
the operational distribution, as long as the fuzzer does not change the sampling strategy adaptively
throughout the fuzzing campaign. For instance, if a compiler fuzzer generates more programs with
loops than programs without—because historically programs with loops have always found more
compiler bugs—then all statistical claims derived from the STADS framework strictly hold w.r.t. that
fuzzer and for that program within the stipulated confidence bounds. The main assumption upon
which the (multinomial and Bernoulli product) models of the STADS framework rely is that the
relative species abundance {pi }Si=1 does not change substantially during the fuzzing campaign. The
compiler fuzzer is simply more likely (greater pi ) to discover a loop-based bug Di than a compiler
fuzzer without that heuristic, for all fuzzing campaigns.
While there may be some bias in the test input generation, there is no adaptive bias for blackbox
fuzzers. A blackbox fuzzer does not leverage feedback from previous test executions to adapt the
test generation strategy during the fuzzing campaign. A generational blackbox fuzzer generates
test inputs either by random sampling [75] or by instantiating elements from an input model,
grammar, or protocol [117]. Amutation-based blackbox fuzzer generates new test inputs by random
perturbations of inputs in the so-called seed corpus. The probability pi to generate a test input that
belong to species Di does not change at all during the fuzzing campaign.
In ecology, the sampling is usually subject to certain biases, as well. A light trap may lure certain
species more than others [57]. An ecologist may prefer to sample certain locations in an assemblage
over others [86]. An ecologist may be more likely to sample species that are larger in body size (or
perhaps prefer to sample only the smaller species in the case of the arachnida class) [72].
9.5 Adaptive Sampling Bias of Feedback-directed Fuzzers
Themain assumption in the STADS framework upon which the multinomial, Bernoulli product, and
Poisson models rely is that the relative species abundance {pi }Si=1 does not change substantially
during the fuzzing campaign. However, feedback-directed fuzzers are based on an adaptive sampling
strategy. A feedback-directed fuzzer leverages program feedback from previous test inputs to learn
and adaptively generate “better” test inputs. The probability pi to sample an input that belongs to
an undiscovered species Di may increase.
9.5.1 Search-based Software Testing. Fuzzers developed in the field of search-based software
testing (SBST) are feedback-directed. A fitness function evaluates how close a test input or set of
test inputs is towards satisfying the concrete fuzzing objective while a meta-heuristic steers the
test generation adaptively towards new test inputs with improved fitness. For instance, a directed
greybox fuzzer [8] evaluates the “distance” of an input to a set of target locations in the program (e.g.,
potential buffer overflow sites) and uses simulated annealing-based power schedules to generate
new test inputs that are “closer” to those target locations. McMinn provides an excellent survey of
SBST existing techniques [73] and identifies future challenges [74].
To establish the impact of the adaptive bias, we strongly suggest to evaluate estimator perfor-
mance for each SBST technique. In future, customized bias-corrected estimators can be developed
that allow accurate estimation and extrapolation for SBST techniques.
9.5.2 Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing. Feedback-directed are also coverage-based greybox
fuzzers [9, 98, 109, 120]. A coverage-based greybox fuzzer is typically mutation-based and hence
starts with a seed corpus. If the fuzzer generates a test input t that belongs to a previously undis-
covered species (e.g., by random perturbations of inputs in the corpus), then t is added to the seed
corpus. Otherwise, t is discarded. At the time when t is added to the seed corpus, the probability
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Fig. 7. Bias in the path coverage estimate for the AFL-fuzzing campaign in our motivating example.
pi to discover any “neighboring” species Di slightly increases, compared to before t was added.
Hence, at first a coverage-based greybox fuzzer might discover more species per unit time than
a mutation-based blackbox fuzzer (which is not feedback-directed). However, in the limit every
coverage-based greybox fuzzer degenerates to a mutation-based blackbox fuzzer. Over time more
and more test inputs need to be generated to discover the next species: The fuzzer cycles several
times through the same set of seeds without any discoveries for hours, later for days. Hence, in
the limit the adaptive bias is non-existent. Thus, if an estimator is consistent for a fuzzer that is
not feedback-directed, it is also consistent for a coverage-based greybox fuzzer. The accuracy of a
consistent estimator increases as sampling effort (i.e., the number generated test inputs) increases.
The adaptive bias is obvious in Figure 7.a which shows the development of the path coverage
estimate over the first 48 hours of the fuzzing campaign in our motivating example (Section 2).
Between five and seven hours, we see a steep drop in the path coverage estimate. The reason
becomes obvious in Figure 7.b which shows the number of paths discovered for the same fuzzing
campaign. Just before the six-hour mark, the number of discovered paths seems to approach
a different asymptote at about 3k paths when suddenly many more paths are discovered. This
sudden increase is not very uncommon for AFL, particularly in the first few hours when still
many new paths are discovered. However, such surges get more uncommon and their magnitude
smaller as sample coverage increases. This can be explained within the Markov chain model of
directed greybox fuzzing [9]. The path coverage estimate quickly recovers over the next 12 hours.
In Figure 7.b, we can see that 24 hours into the fuzzing campaign a large percentage of paths has
been discovered (w.r.t. the improved estimate of the asymptote). At this time, our path coverage
estimate quite accurately puts the coverage at about 98%. In future, we plan to investigate the
correlation between the discovery probability estimate Uˆ of the sample and the bias/precision of
the species coverage estimate S(n)/Sˆ .
In our preliminary empirical study, we used the coverage-based greybox fuzzer AFL [98] to
investigate the performance of the proposed estimators and extrapolators for the state-of-the-art
vulnerability detection tool. The results are promising (see Section 6.5). For AFL, the magnitude
of the estimator bias was substantial right before and during short intervals when the number
of discovered path-species increased suddenly and significantly. The extrapolation would not
anticipate such sudden surges. However, the bias from adaptive sampling reduced over time. Close
to the asymptotic species richness, the impact appeared negligible.
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In future work, several correctionmethodologies for the adaptive sampling bias may be developed.
In software testing, we can analyze the program, e.g., to quantify the likelihood of sudden increases
in species coverage. Advanced program analyses may allow for static bias-correction strategies.
For coverage-based greybox fuzzers, as species discovery decelerates, the impact of the adaptive
bias reduces, as well. Estimates of sample completeness C or species richness S may be used as
predictors of the adaptive bias which allow for dynamic bias-correction strategies. Moreover, we
anticipate empirical studies of estimator performance for other greybox fuzzers.
9.5.3 Symbolic Execution. Systematic (often symbolic execution-based) whitebox fuzzers are
designed to discover previously undiscovered species with every test input that is generated. Hence,
the STADS framework explicitly does not apply as such fuzzers violate the underlying assumptions
of our statistical framework. For instance, a symbolic execution-based whitebox fuzzer is designed
to systematically enumerate every (interesting) path in the program [14]. Every generated test input
exercises a different path. Once a species Di has been discovered, the probability pi of generating
another input t ∈ Di is pi = 0. This is a substantial change from before the discovery.
However, we note that security researchers can use a blackbox or greybox fuzzer to establish the
species evenness J for that program, and based on its value decide whether to choose that fuzzer or
the symbolic execution-based whitebox fuzzer for the actual fuzzing. As symbolic execution-based
fuzzers are better suited to discover rare species, there should be a certain minimal value of J below
which the symbolic execution-based whitebox fuzzer performs better than the blackbox or greybox
fuzzer. In future, this value can be empirically investigated.
9.6 Adaptive Bias Correction
Unlike sampling strategies in ecology, the STADS frameworks allows continuous estimation and
extrapolation during the fuzzing campaign itself. This provides opportunities for continuous adaptive
bias correction. We can continuously assess the bias of our extrapolation by first predicting the
value of our estimation target and later comparing it to its empirical value. The difference between
predicted and empirical value describes the estimator bias. A continuous monitoring of the bias
may allow to gradually control for and correct the observed bias.
Monitoring the fuzzing campaign also enables on-the-fly fuzzer selection. In earlier work [7], we
found that even the most effective systematic fuzzer would be less efficient than a random fuzzer
if generating a test input takes relatively too long. For short fuzzing campaigns, a random fuzzer
would always outperform a systematic fuzzer. However, at a certain time, it would be more efficient
to switch to systematic fuzzing. Using the proposed extrapolators, we can make an informed
decision when to switch, e.g,. from the “biased” random fuzzer AFL [98] to the systematic fuzzer,
KLEE [14].
10 CONCLUSION
In this article, I introduced the foundations of a general, statistical framework that models software
testing and analysis as discovery of species (STADS) to address a fundamental challenge in software
testing: the statistically well-grounded extrapolation from program behaviors observed during
testing. The STADS framework draws from over three decades of research in ecological biostatistics,
where the challenge is to extrapolate from properties of the species observed in a sample to
properties of the species in the complete assemblage.
Based on the STADS framework, researchers can, for the first time, formally discuss, estimate
and assess a fuzzer’s effectiveness and efficiency, a campaign’s completeness, cost-effectiveness,
and residual risk, and a program’s fuzzability. For the first time, test engineers have gained the
ability to make informed decisions about whether to abort or continue a fuzzing campaign; and to
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Table 7. A summary of the pertinent estimators and extrapolators for the STADS model that were discussed
and/or evaluated in this article.
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quantify what has been learned about the program at any point throughout the fuzzing campaign.
Beyond this initial work, I pointed to a large number of opportunities for researchers to improve
and tailor the ecologic methodologies to the automated testing and analysis process.
The first empirical evidence was provided that the main hypothesis that is underpinning the
STADS framework (and thus allows the usage of existing ecological methodologies in the context
of automated software testing and analysis) actually holds. The multinomial model, where each
input belongs to exactly one species, was integrated and successfully evaluated. The evaluated
estimators from ecology showed good performance, e.g., during estimation and extrapolation of
path coverage. Thereupon, the STADS framework was extended with the Bernoulli product model,
where each input can belong to one or more species. We show that the estimators can be efficiently
computed even for large programs, and are guaranteed to approach the true value as the fuzzing
effort increases. An overview of the pertinent estimators for both models can be found in Table 7.
The presented predictive program analysis scales to programs of arbitrary size and is general
enough to work with arbitrary finite and discrete program properties. For instance, the STADS
framework allows to estimate the asymptotic total number of paths, information flows, reachable
target locations, unique program crashes, or the number of statements that are actually executable
by the fuzzer. It allows to extrapolate code coverage, as well as mutation-adequacy efficiently and
with improving accuracy. Species coverage can be used effectively to judge whether the fuzzing
campaign is almost completed.
Many estimators and extrapolators are readily available as statistical analyses to try out online
[107, 118] or as packages in the R programming language [25, 60]. Our integration Pythia with
the popular vulnerability detection tool AFL can be downloaded from Github at:
https://github.com/mboehme/pythia
The STADS framework provides a large number of opportunities for future work. For instance,
software can be understood as megadiverse assemblage which features a large number of very rare
species. Novel estimators can be identified or developed that address the peculiarities of automated
software testing as species discovery. Feedback-directed fuzzers introduce an adaptive bias that can
result in sudden surges in species discovered. Adaptive bias correction strategies can be developed
that leverage program analysis to anticipate and account for such surges to correct the adaptive
bias dynamically.
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